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Abstract 
The European Union is expected to respond to world events every day and 
terrorist acts are predominate and often conducted by terrorist organizations or 
non-state actors. One of the most delicate cases is the Lebanese Hezbollah 
frequently resorting to violence and has over the last 20 years grown evermore 
important in the Middle East and Lebanon, thereby increasingly elevating the 
need for the EU to respond. The thesis investigates whether the EU is reactive to 
occurring events by analysing whether the EU’s attitude has changed over time 
and secondly, why the EU’s attitude has changed under the theoretical 
assumptions of Social Constructivism and Neorealism. This study analyses the 
discursive constructions of EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah and to understand 
why this change in attitude has occurred, I analyse three highly relevant 
explanations: Hezbollah’s activities, the influence of France and the influence of 
the US. The study concludes that the EU’s attitude has in fact changed over the 
years resulting in an explicit mentioning of Hezbollah combined with a more 
forceful and cautious attitude, and although France, more than the US, seemingly 
has influenced this change to an extent, it’s clearly evident that Hezbollah’s 
activities undoubtedly has affected the EU’s changed attitude.   
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1 Introduction       
The European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) has become increasingly 
aware of the need for giving a response to world events faced with each day and 
terrorist acts are a predominate one. Terrorist acts are more often than not 
executed by terrorist organisations or non-state actors, many of which are 
increasingly taking place closer to home, on European soil, such as the Burgas 
Bus bomb in July 20121, elevating the need for analysing EU’s attitude towards 
non-state actors. Indications suggest that there has been a change in EU’s attitude 
toward moderate2 Islamist non-state actors (Kausch 2009: 129) and an interesting 
case to investigate is Lebanese Hezbollah. This change can be seen in EU 
statements from 1983 to the stronger use of language in later statements from 
2012: “The Ten appeal for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of 
violence and pressure in Lebanon and to national reconciliation. They call upon 
all parties to” (Appendix: Statement 1) and “The EU strongly condemns the bomb 
attack…which killed Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan […] this act of 
violence as well as other assassination attempts, must be fully investigated and the 
perpetrators must be brought to justice swiftly” (Appendix: Statement 30). 
Investigating the change in EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah over time will 
indicate whether the EU is reactive to the occurring events or whether France and 
the United States’ influence has changed the EU’s attitude with regards to a 
particular event they are addressing concerning Hezbollah, which would thus 
indicate the EU being passive and not reactive and changing its attitude towards 
Hezbollah based on these state’s influence. 
 
One of the most intricate, debated and delicate cases is the Lebanese Hezbollah3 
that, like Hamas4, still continue to employ violence and thereof fails to completely 
                                                
1”Hezbollah linked to Burgas bus bombing in Bulgaria” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
21342192 (BBC 2013b),  
See also ”Cyprus court jails Hezbollah man for plotting to attack Israelis” by Michele Kambas  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-cyprus-hezbollah-idUSBRE92R0KN20130328 
(Reuters.com 2013)  
2 In this study, the term moderate will be employed according to Kristina Kausch’s definition that signify 
Islamists as  ”…those parties or movements among the Islamist spectrum that have eschewed or formally 
renounced violence in the domestic context and aim at achieving their goals within the margins of the 
political process.” (Kausch 2009: 129). 
3 There are several transliterated versions of Hezbollah (Party of Allah or Party of employed God), 
including Hizbullah, Hizballah, Hizb’ullah and Hizb’allah, however, in this study, for purposes of 
consistency and simplicity, the term Hezbollah will be utilized.  
4 Hamas is a known Palestinian militant Islamic group controlling the Gaza strip and is officially 
dedicated, as stipulated in the group’s manifesto, to the obliteration of Israel and establishing a Palestinian 
State. Israel, the EU, Canada, the US and Japan has listed Hamas as a terrorist organisation due to its 
continuous use of violence. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522 (BBC.com. 2012) 
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be labelled as ‘moderates’. However, EU’s attitude toward Islamist non-state 
actors need to take into consideration the importance Hezbollah, like Hamas, has 
within the contextual spectrum in the Middle Eastern region (Ibid 134). Hezbollah 
has over the last 20 years seemingly gained greater popular support both from 
within Lebanon and other Shi’ite societies notably in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia (Haddad 2006; Norton 2007: 12-13).   
 
Furthermore, Hezbollah is a unique case as it is considered to be the A-team of 
terrorism (Levitt 2005) and has reportedly an increasingly active and global reach 
beyond the Lebanese borders; in Europe, South American, Africa, Southeast Asia 
and Middle East (Levitt 2013: XV), which has made it that much more important 
to address for the EU. What make it even more unique and distinct from Hamas is 
its relation with its patron Iran and being a dedicated Bashar al-Assad ally, and its 
different conceptualizations; a terror group, social movement, political party, and 
as Augustus R. Norton (2007) points out, “Hezbollah is not easily understood 
either by simplistic stereotypes that typically inform depictions of the organization 
in the newspapers and on the airwaves of the Western world nor by black and 
white worldviews.” (Ibid:8).   
 
There has evidently been a change in EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah over the 
years in which Hezbollah is more explicitly and forcefully referred to, however, 
implicit reference occurs in official EU statements and declarations with the 
occasional cautious tone. Despite Hezbollah not renouncing from violent tactics 
the EU seem to have developed a cautious tone, however, over the years, their 
active involvement seem to have reached new public heights indicating a change 
in EU attitude. Although it seems more forceful in recent years, the cautious tone 
that characterizes their official statements is indicated by the partial designation. 
Occurring in 2013, as opposed to listing the entire Hezbollah organisation as a 
terrorist organisation, seem to further confirm the cautious but increasingly 
forceful change in EU attitude towards Hezbollah. Furthermore, the Neorealist 
theory argue that there is increasingly a multipolar international system of both 
states and non-state actors that become more intricate with actors of more equal 
distribution of capabilities and power resulting in a threatening “us vs. them” 
attitude (Elman 2008: 19; Dunne & Schmidt 2014: 1014; Waltz 1990: 36), and the 
Social Constructivists stipulates that these power and capabilities within a 
multipolar world system are ascribed meaning by the actors’ ideas, identity and 
interests (Wendt 1999). Hence, the explanations I will use are derived from these 
theoretical assumptions and are Hezbollah’s own terrorist activities, the influence 
of France with its strategic interests in Lebanon, and the influence exerted by US.  
 
The EU, formerly known as the European Community (EC), have long had a 
special connection to the Middle east within which Hezbollah is primarily active:  
        
“The Member States of the European Community have particularly 
important political, historical, geographical, economic, religious, 
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cultural and human links with the countries and peoples of the Middle 
East. They cannot therefore adopt a passive attention towards a region, 
which is so close to them nor remain indifferent to the grave problems 
besetting it. The repercussions of these problems affect the Twelve in 
many ways. At the present time, tension and conflict in the near and 
Middle East are continuing and worsening” (Bull. EC 2-1987, point 
2.4.3)   
 
The EU is not passive towards Hezbollah because it is expected of the EU to react 
or give a statement on world events constantly occurring, but they have seemingly 
only used implicit reference to Hezbollah, however, the EU seem to have adopted 
a more stern and forceful attitude over the years especially signified by the more 
strong use of words and explicit reference to Hezbollah, thus indicating that a 
change has occurred over time in their discursive constructions of Hezbollah. In 
this paper I argue that the EU has adopted a more forceful but still cautious, at 
times, attitude towards Hezbollah over time. Furthermore, I argue that it is mostly 
due to Hezbollah’s own increased activities that the EU’s attitude has changed 
thus resulting in the EU being rather reactive than proactive.   
 
Therefore, in this study I will employ the method of discourse analysis to analyse 
how the EU statements, made with implicit or explicit reference to Hezbollah, has 
changed over time looking at semantics; meaning attributed to a word or sentence, 
pragmatics; the context within which meaning was attributed to the word or 
sentence and stylistics; the selection of words employed by the author 
complimented by the use of positive and/or negative expressions (Fairclough 
2001:5; Chilton 2004:48; Dijk 1983:24; Dijk 2008:80). In answering why a 
change in EU’s discursive constructions has occurred relevant and plausible 
explanations will be analysed in the second part of the analysis and they are: 
Hezbollah’s violent activities, the influence of Lebanon’s closest European friend 
and colonial ties; France (Aljazeera.com 2012) and the US’s influential position in 
international relations that cannot be disregarded as derived from the theoretical 
frameworks. Additionally, I am well aware that there may be many other plausible 
explanations, however, in answering my research question: Has the EU’s attitude 
towards Hezbollah changed over time and why, the explanations chosen above 
will offer relevant insight and analytical discussion and understanding into this 
change of attitude.      
1.1 Statement of Purpose and Research Question   
For years and years, the EU has traditionally always voiced their opinion when 
events in the world transpire and more actively so in later years. Being what the 
EU is today: an advocator of fundamental norms such as human rights, 
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democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression and more, the EU is expected to 
constantly express opinion on world matters faced with each day. Hezbollah’s 
complex structure, difficult conceptualizations and increasing significance in 
world matters all add to the increasing expectation of EU’s need to react to and 
speak with one voice; the EU’s ability to agree on joint declarations and/or 
statements the heads of governments of all EU member states stand behind. The 
EU has opined on many issues over the years and amongst many are “the EU 
partially freezing aid to Rwanda due to the possible financial support by the state 
of rebel activities” (Smith 2012), “ex-aide to Milosevic takes power in Serbia, 
unnerving EU” (Robinson & Vasovic 2012), “EU approves tighter sanctions on 
North Korea” (Reuters 2013) and “EU to give Haiti $25.1M in humanitarian aid” 
(Eubusiness 2013).   
 
It is fairly known, that the EU is traditionally not inclined to engage, in any way, 
with non-state actors who condone the use of and employ violence and therefore 
the EU distance and renounce from any type of dialogue (Kausch 2009: 129), 
however, some non-state actors have changed and use politics and democratic 
procedural means to increase popularity and transform it into “electoral success” 
and acquire power (Ibid 130). Consequently, they are depicted as actors with the 
ability to reform, which more importantly could lead to democratic reforms, an 
enduringly stable and peaceful community with an aptitude to similar EU 
democratic aspirations (Ibid). Hezbollah is an excellent case in point as they have 
used politics to involve themselves and induce a somewhat stable community in 
their own way, however, the EU’s attitude seemingly has changed into a more 
forceful and explicit one whilst adopting cautiousness at times. This leads to the 
question why a change in the EU’s discursive constructions; their attitude, 
towards Hezbollah has occurred over time. I am well aware that there may be 
several influential explanations within international relations, however, in this 
paper, the explanations I cannot exclude and find most important and relevant are 
the activities of Hezbollah, influence possibly exerted by the one EU member 
state with closest colonial ties to Lebanon where Hezbollah is predominantly 
active; France, and the dominant pressure exerted by the US cannot be 
disregarded with regards to whether EU’s attitude toward Hezbollah has changed 
over time which thereby leads one to naturally discuss why.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the EU is reactive to 
world events by answering the following research questions: Has the EU’s 
attitudes towards Hezbollah changed over time and why? 
1.2 Previous Research 
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There has been some academic papers conducted on EU’s approach to political 
Islamist groups, as opposed to my particular angle of this study; EU’s attitudes, 
such as Timo Behr’s ‘Dealing with Political Islam: Foreign Policy-Making 
between the Union and the Member States’ presented at the Fifth Pan-European 
Conference on EU Politics in June 2010. Behr (2010) addresses the EU’s foreign 
policies with political Islamist parties or organizations and the shift in engagement 
with various Islamist groups that include Turkey’s AKP (Turkish: Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi), Morocco’s PJD (Justice and Development Party), Hamas and 
Hezbollah.  
 
Furthermore, Kristina Kausch (2009) touches on similar basis in her chapter on 
‘Europe’s Engagement with Moderate Islamists’ and argues there has been an 
identifiable shift in EU attitudes towards moderate Islamist actors. Furthermore, 
Kausch suggests EU’s new attitude, as opposed to the hushed European 
engagement with Islamist organizations, is an attempt to curb re-radicalization and 
the reformed view of moderate Islamists as rational actors seeking power through 
democratic vices is something the EU should take advantage of. Asseburg (2009) 
in his ‘Conclusions: Dynamics in Political Islam and Challenges for European 
Policies’ touches slightly on the challenges the EU is facing in todays’ political 
Islam and discusses somewhat EU’s approach to Hezbollah and it differing from 
the classified terrorist organisation Hamas. However, it should be taken into 
consideration that at the time of writing the EU hadn’t listed Hezbollah’s military 
wing a terrorist organisation, which leads one to ponder if the entire organization 
of Hezbollah would be terrorist listed, whether the EU would in fact employ the 
‘no dialogue’ strategy making it illegal for the EU to engage with terrorist listed 
actors/organizations. Furthermore, Boubekeur (2009) writes about how the EU 
should improve its engagement with moderate Islamist movements in her 
independent contribution in the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance titled ‘Updating the European Union’s Policies towards 
Islamist Parties and Radical Actors’. 
 
Moreover, a PhD dissertation was submitted last year in the University of Exeter 
that is close to what I am endeavouring to do and it is written by Adeeb M. A. 
Bader (2013) titled ‘European Union’s Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian 
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Inconsistencies and Paradoxes’. Bader 
examines the inconsistencies and paradoxes in the EU discourse towards Hamas 
and what determines those contradictions when answering questions of “how” and 
“why”. Additionally, Bader examines the influence of external actors on the EU’s 
foreign policy towards Hamas, which is similar to what I aim to do, however, with 
Hezbollah as a case in point.    
1.3 Background  
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In order to understand EU’s relation to Hezbollah it’s important to understand the 
how Hezbollah has developed over time. Hence, I will provide a brief account of 
Hezbollah’s emergence and in the next subsection provide an overview of EU’s 
relation with Hezbollah as well as a brief discussion for choosing Hezbollah in 
this study. 
1.3.1 Hezbollah: The Organization  
Hezbollah’s origin dates back to 1978 when it developed as an Islamic movement, 
and driven by a long held social and political dissatisfaction amongst the Shiite 
members of the clergy in Lebanon and with its ideological teachings from the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 who became their patron, Hezbollah promoted 
vociferously in Lebanon the necessary fight against the Western powers and the 
importance of traditional Islamic principles (Alagha 2006: 13; Townsend 2010: 12 
&14). 1975 was the beginning of the 15-year-old civil war that would bring 
bloodshed and continuous strife between factions in Lebanon; Druze, Christians, 
Shiite and Sunni groups, together with Syrian participation and this was the final 
spark after growing tension and dissatisfaction from the 1960s (Ibid). With the 
Israeli invasion in 1982, Hezbollah was given momentum and sufficient cause to 
fight Israel in the name of Lebanon and re-claim what was considered rightfully 
theirs; the southern parts. In the 1980s, Hezbollah has reportedly participated in 
multiple attacks: the attack against the Multinational Peace-Keeping forces and 
the U.S Marines and the hostage takings (Mannes 2004:170-172 & 177; Frontline 
World 2013). In addition, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner was said to be the 
work of Hezbollah and the aftermath bombing of the Saudi Embassy (Levitt 2013: 
42; Mannes 2004: 173). The Ta’if Accords were signed ending the civil war in 
1989. Syria, Lebanon’s protector, in concurrence with Hezbollah made certain 
that a demarcation between militia and resistance was agreed upon, thus, the 
Lebanese government through institutionalization considered it “a legitimate-
national resistance” (Alagha 2006: 41). Thus solidifying their influence in 
Lebanon.  
           
Furthermore, at the turn of 1991, as Hezbollah adopted the popularly received 
open policy, infitah (openness) (Ibid: 14), thus, began what Ayatollah Fadlallah, 
Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, dubbed Hezbollah’s “Lebanonization”. This meant 
that Hezbollah ought to adapt its approach to the situation in Lebanon, thus, “in 
spreading the faith, the Muslims in Lebanon should not follow procedures that 
would be inappropriate to Lebanon.” (Fadlallah & Soueid 1995: 67). By 1992, as 
Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was elected Secretary General, Hezbollah’s third leader, 
Hezbollah embarked on a political campaign. The first parliamentary elections 
held after the civil war, Hezbollah successfully won twelve seats, mostly due to its 
increased popularity both in the suburbs of Beirut and its stronghold in the south, 
particularly Qana (Alagha 2006: 42-43). Moreover, Hezbollah’s raison d’être 
(reason for existence) has always been the elimination of the illegal existence of 
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Israel due to Zionism: the creation of a Jewish state (Gaub 2013:7-8). Hence, 
several clashes with Israel and others have occurred (Katzman 1995: 11; Fisk 
1996; UN Press Release 1996; Leonnig 2006; BBC.co.uk. 2001). So, in 2006, 
Hezbollah reportedly kidnapped two Israeli soldiers that brought on the one 
month long war with Israel (Geukjian 2008; Tür 2007) which yielded 
international response (Baker 2006; Tisdall & MacAskill 2006). After 2006, 
Hezbollah’s raison d’être had to change. Despite its antipathy towards Israel, 
Hezbollah couldn’t justify attacking Israel without any provocation without 
compromising its legitimized identity as a resistance movement against the 
Israelis and its role as an influential political party. Thus, as Ayatollah Fadlallah 
noted, Hezbollah’s leading body knows that the multifaceted organization “does 
not function in a vacuum but within an environment that imposes certain 
restrictions on its freedom of action” (Ranstorp 1998: 108). So, the Palestinian 
cause was a logical fit with Israel as the enemy and Iran’s personal interest that 
continuously has been reiterated as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke to the nation in 
2006 stating “the most important issue in Arab society is the Palestinian cause” 
(BBC.com 2006). 
 
After the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 
(Bray-Collins 2013: 281; BBC.com 2014; Dahdah 2005; (Mehlis UNIIIC Report 
2005), Lebanon split into two houses; Hezbollah and its pro-Syrian allies, 8th of 
March, and the anti-Syrian 14th of March group, in commemoration of Rafik 
Hariri, consisting of Druze, Sunni and Christian political parties, leading to 
numeral deadlocks in the forming of a government (Wiegand 2009: 676). A wave 
of politically motivated attacks followed (Knudsen 2010: 5 & 15-16; Naharnet 
Newsdesk 2012; Schwerma 2010: 70; Bakri 2007; Levitt 2013: 7; Chulov 2012), 
which has rendered the political climate in Lebanon precarious and has led to an 
inter-political struggle between pro-Syrian, mainly Hezbollah, and anti-Syrian 
factions resulting in political deadlocks; some being resolved only to create new 
ones (telegraph.co.uk 2008; Dailystar.com.lb 2013b; Kechichian 2014; Worth 
2008; UNSC report 2008). With the Syrian crisis looming and spilling over, a 
disassociation policy: the Baabda Declaration, has been advocated vociferously 
and to fully abide by in Lebanon but Hezbollah’s active involvement in the 
conflict has made it difficult to implement (Dailystar.com.lb 2013a).     
1.3.2 EU’s relation with Hezbollah 
The EU’s direct involvement with Islamist political movements is traditionally 
severely thin and non-existent, or more often than not fairly non-publicized as 
some critics argue that states’ publicized engagement with Islamists would endow 
them with “undeserved attention and legitimacy” and disagree with the EU’s 
ability to influence the endogenous characteristics and change of Islamist political 
movements through democratic reform away from potential re-radicalization and 
instability in the Middle East region (Kausch 2009: 129-130). Despite the width 
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of criticism, the seemingly lack of feasible options are resulting in an increasing 
concurrence of the necessity of engaging with Islamist political organizations. 
Eliminating the stigmatization of Islamist parties or actors active in political 
circles is developing into a very important issue for the EU, especially within the 
context of improving the opportunities for participating in the political scene in 
their respective countries (Ibid: 131). Hence, it has become gradually understood 
by the EU that the influence of Islamist organizations cannot be disregarded and 
as their rightful need for actively participating in the political system, which 
possibly would lead to a stabilizing community in the Middle East. This would 
potentially curb any potential re-radicalization. The EU’s foreign policy speak has 
suggested over the years the will for improving relations with Islamist political 
organizations (Emerson and Youngs 2007: 5) and it is commonly understood, as 
argued by Rees and Aldrich (2005), that the EU “conceptualizes radical Islam in 
less absolute terms” than the US (Ibid: 905). However, despite the optimistic 
commitments the EU has taken a more hesitant approach to Islamists as indicated 
by the EU’s choice to conduct low-level contact with Hezbollah:  
 
European states opposed the US push for a blanket proscription of 
Hezbollah, recognizing the latter to be the fastest growing political 
organization in Lebanon... A number of European embassies 
commenced low-level dialogue with Hezbollah, with the aim of 
backing the group’s political arm against the militia wing. (Young 
2006 quoted in Seeberg 2009: 83) 
Hezbollah, despite not fulfilling the non-violence condition to completely be 
denoted as a moderate Islamist actor, cannot be excluded. Nonetheless, still 
considered one of the important cases in the regional political reality of the 
Middle East and therefore, cannot be omitted in EU’s relation with Hezbollah, 
Lebanon and the region. It is commonly viewed that the influence Hezbollah 
exerts in Lebanese politics is of the degree that no solution will be possible 
without their involvement (Kausch 2009: 134). Open EU engagement with 
Hezbollah has been fairly accepted and viewed as essential by the EU, as opposed 
to any direct engagement with representatives from Hamas is deemed illegal as it 
was designated a terrorist organization in 2003 (Rettman 2012). However, with 
the EU designating Hezbollah’s military wing as terrorist organization in July 
2013 (BBC.com 2013a), it became illegal for the EU to engage with Hezbollah’s 
military wing whilst leaving the door slightly ajar for EU relations with 
Hezbollah’s political wing. Despite this, low-level contact with political 
representatives from Hezbollah seems to be the preferred way of communication, 
since EU states remain hesitant to have “official high-level contact” but still prefer 
to have “open lines of communication with the political wing of Hezbollah than 
none (Asseburg 2009: 176). Furthermore, Seeberg (2009) delves into the 
complexities of the EU-Hezbollah relations:  
 
“The Hezbollah is a strong or even dominant actor, competing with 
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the official government for political hegemony, thereby constructing a 
‘dual power’ situation in Lebanon: a situation where two sources of 
authority are competing for power and legitimacy… The EU 
reluctance to strengthen relations with Islamist organizations in the 
Mediterranean puts pressure on the EU in Lebanon, in the sense that it 
has to position itself in relation to the complexities of the ‘dual power’ 
situation there.”(85 & 87-88) 
 
The EU’s partial designation of Hezbollah’s military wing and France’s role in it 
(Liphshiz 2013; Black 2013) has not been without grave criticism, especially by 
the US, Israel, Canada and the Netherlands and none other than Hezbollah’s own 
Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem who rejects any distinction made 
between Hezbollah as a political and a resistance entity by stating that:  
 
“We don’t have a military wing and a political one; we don’t have 
Hezbollah on one hand and the resistance party on the other. Every 
element of Hezbollah, from commanders to members as well as our 
various capabilities, are in the services of the resistance and we have 
nothing but the resistance as a priority” (Dailystar.co.lb 2012) […] 
Hezbollah has a single leadership. All political, social and jihad work 
is tied to the decisions of this leadership. The same leadership that 
directs the parliamentary and government work also leads jihad 
actions in the struggle against Israel.”(Latimes.com 2009). 
 
Therefore, EU relations with Hezbollah have not been easy to maintain and more 
often than not is characterized by evident difficulties in knowing how to respond 
to Hezbollah and maintain open line of communication with the political wing. 
Hezbollah has in recent years established itself as an actor on the international 
scene attempting to, partaking and/or executing numeral violent terror attacks 
from Thailand to Europe to the US, as well as reportedly conducting money 
laundering, drug and illegal weapon trade in Europe and elsewhere. This has most 
likely added pressure on the EU and contributed to its difficulties in how to 
engage with Hezbollah and thereby EU’s attitude towards the Islamist 
organization (Norell 2013).      
1.3.3 Selecting Hezbollah  
Many don’t know that much about Hezbollah, and if they do, it’s usually in 
simplistic terms such as terrorist organization, a conception that fail to completely 
comprehend the complexities of the organisation that has transformed over the 
years in order to remain current. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah is in several ways a 
phenomenon with the regional interests constantly surrounding it. Its influential 
power as a political and military actor in Lebanon has elevated Hezbollah’s 
position as a resilient one. The political challenges in the Middle Eastern region 
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has not eased the EU’s difficulty in defining its attitude; be it the growing role of 
Iran due to its cooperation and axis with Hezbollah and Syria (Seeberg 2009:86-
87). This contributes to the complex and distinct characteristics of Hezbollah, as 
opposed to the Palestinian Hamas who doesn’t have the same ideological alliance 
with Iran and does not actively participate in Syria as Hezbollah does, hence, is 
not faced with the same political challenges in the region. Even though there is a 
fairly good amount of information available on the organization and its different 
conceptualizations, there isn’t that many studies carried out on whether the EU’s 
attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why a change has occurred. 
Additionally, the discussions surrounding Hezbollah and its growing and 
established role as an actor on the international scene is leading to the more 
pressing and necessary need of discussing and understanding the organization, and 
more importantly how international actors such as the EU chooses to engage with 
and thereby their attitude towards similar non-state Islamist actors.  
1.4 Choice of Data 
In this study, I will employ both primary and secondary sources to give a certain 
width and comprehensive understanding of whether and why the EU’s attitude 
toward Hezbollah has changed over time, as well as conduct my own analysis of 
the primary empirical material at my disposal. I will utilize the Bulletin of the 
European Communities from the 1980 to 1993, because Hezbollah first emerged 
in the 1980s, and continue with Bulletin of the European Union available online 
from 1994 to the last EU Bulletin issue covering events in July-August 2009, 
because they seized to be available in the same format and were replaced by the 
EU News Website5. I use the Bulletin of European Communities/European Union 
because they provide a detailed description of the monthly activities of the EC and 
the EU and more importantly relay official council statements, conclusions and/or 
declarations addressing events or occurrences in the world. By sifting through a 
large quantity of empirical material from the beginning of the 1980s and onwards, 
I will select specific relevant periods of time discussing EU’s attitude towards 
Hezbollah and emphasize the change in attitude by analysing EU’s discursive 
constructions of Hezbollah. Furthermore, why the change in EU attitudes has 
occurred will be analysed by discussing influential explanations identified as the 
following: Hezbollah’s activities, France’s colonial and close ties with Lebanon 
and the influence of the US cannot be disregarded in matters of international 
relations. There are many other explanations that could be relevant: Israel’s 
influence and relation to the EU and the important role of Iran may well be 
relevant, however, in this study the explanations identified above are, according to 
me, the most important explanations to analyse when answering my research 
question. 
                                                
5 See http://europa.eu/newsroom/index_en.htm  
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Furthermore, it would seem rather void and unnecessarily time consuming to use 
all material from the 1980s and onwards since Hezbollah is not constantly 
mentioned in official statements, conclusions or declarations. Therefore, I will, 
after sifting through material from 1980, analyse statements from different years 
that are relevant with regards to my research question and where reference; 
implicit such as “parties in Lebanon” or explicit by name, to Hezbollah has been 
made that indicate a change in the EU’s discursive constructions, hence, EU’s 
changed attitude towards Hezbollah, which in turn will provide for a richer and 
concentrated foundation for analysis. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Bulletin of 
the European Union is only available through mid-2009, which means that in 
order to have a comprehensive time frame I will therefore complement it with the 
use of Council Conclusions from 2009 to 2013.  
1.5 Limitations and Source Criticism 
This study includes important limitations that need to be taken into consideration 
and this includes the making of interpretations. This analysis will incorporate 
levels of interpretations, which will be my own and therefore, could, most likely, 
diverge from others’ interpretations and will certainly, and hopefully, not be the 
only versions available. Yet, I hope that my interpretations will offer an awareness 
and comprehension of whether the EU’s attitudes toward Hezbollah have changed 
over time and why this change has occurred. Inherent to interpretations is the 
concept of objectivity and due to the likelihood of numeral levels of 
interpretation; it renders it almost impossible to be completely objective. Thus, I 
will make interpretations of EU statements, declarations and/or conclusions, 
which can also be viewed as their interpretations of events or occurrences upon 
which they have based their statements on, however, it should be noted that it is 
difficult to distance oneself from such a natural aptness for interpretation in any 
communicative act.  
 
Furthermore, the number of EU statements, declarations and conclusions will vary 
depending on where one as a researcher makes delimitations with regard to the 
length of the study and the aim of the study. The same goes for the variety of 
explanations available when investigating why a change in the EU’s attitudes 
toward Hezbollah has changed over time. Thus, making delimitations is an 
important, if not essential, aspect when conducting any study and so is the 
acceptance that all possible explanations cannot be included. However, most 
importantly is taking into consideration the various possible explanatory factors 
available and thereafter make reasonable and pragmatic decisions relevant to the 
aim of the study and the research questions, which is how I have reasoned when 
considering possible explanations. Moreover, the use of council conclusions as 
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complement to the Bulletin of the European Communities/Union is a necessary 
and pragmatic choice in order to have a comprehensive and continuous timeframe. 
I could not see how ending mid-2009, when the Bulletin of the European Union 
was discontinued and transformed into an online EU newsroom, thus making it 
impossible to find statements made by the EU in that format, would provide a 
comprehensive study, therefore, I felt the need for complimenting my empirical 
material.   
1.6. Outline of the Study  
In this paper, I will in the first chapter provide an introduction to the study and the 
aim of the paper. Additionally, previous research on the EU’s attitude towards 
Islamist non-state actors involved in violent activities and a background on 
Hezbollah will be provided in order to offer a comprehensive understanding of the 
following section on EU’s relations with Hezbollah, which is considered a 
prerequisite and will contribute to the understanding of my research questions of 
whether the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why. 
Furthermore, in the second chapter there will be a discussion about the 
philosophical considerations taken within which the study will be situated and is 
followed by the theoretical frameworks of Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism and 
Alexander Wendt’s theory of Social Constructivism that will be employed in a 
complimentary fashion and be rather helpful in answering my research questions. 
The reason is that both approaches revolve around the fundamental principle that 
there is an inherent state of anarchy; a society without the existence of a world 
government, in the international system and that states are not the absolute key 
actors in global politics. Thereafter, in chapter 3 a discussion of the 
methodological section will follow and in chapter 4 a two-part analysis will 
follow where I answer both the question of whether the EU’s attitudes towards 
Hezbollah has changed over time and why by analysing the three previously 
explanations. Lastly, in the final chapter 5, I will provide the conclusions derived 
from the study and discuss possibilities for further research.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1. A Philosophical Discussion  
When conducting a research project it is imperative to maintain a research 
strategy to uphold a general orientation towards the methodological aspect of the 
study. There are particular assumptions of ontological and epistemological nature, 
which concerns the way in which a researcher endeavours to investigate and 
acquire knowledge about the social world we live in. The philosophy of science 
stance we maintain and within which we situate the study is very important to be 
clear upon and well defined, and thereby, avoiding possible misunderstandings 
about the assumptions of the nature of and the way of approaching the social 
world (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 1).  
 
The ontological standpoint are mainly concerned with the nature of reality; 
primarily if they can be regarded as social objects independent from social actors 
or are merely socially constructed consisting of viewpoints and the acts of social 
actors (Delanty and Strydom 2003:6). The latter ontological assumptions rendered 
suitable and in alignment with the research questions is constructionism that 
emphasize occurrences in the social world and the meaning attributed to them is 
by the social interactions of social actors. Thus, indicating that such occurrences 
are continuously being reconsidered and altered (Graue & Walsh, 1998; Byrne-
Armstrong et al 2001). The former ontological stance is objectivism which 
assumes that social actors do not influence social occurrences and its attributed 
significance (Bitter-Davis & Parker, 1997; Gallagher, 2008); however it doesn’t 
suit the importance of social occurrences and the dependence on social actors. 
Understanding social actors and their influence on the occurrences and their 
meaning is key in this research study, and we cannot disregard the influence 
actors have on a phenomenon of change (Bryman 2012: 33).  
 
In the epistemological viewpoint concerned with what is or ought to be considered 
as acceptable knowledge in the social sciences, there are primarily two 
epistemological views: positivism and interpretivism. On the one hand, the 
positivist researcher argues the use of natural science methods when analysing the 
social world; hence in an objective manner (Bryman 2012: 27-28). On the other 
hand, the interpretivist researcher contends that the study and subjective 
significance of social actors/actions and the inherent institutional structures are 
vastly contrasting which requires a different way than the natural scientific 
approach. A known demarcation was postulated by Von Wright (1971), between 
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what was designated hermeneutics; a theological notion that emphasizes the 
methodological and theoretical consideration of interpreting actions by social 
actors, and the positivist view. The latter endeavours to explain human behaviour, 
whilst the former seeks to understand the behaviour of social actors (Ibid). In 
accordance with Von Wright is the assumptions of phenomenology that identify 
the need for a different logic of epistemological approach: “social reality has a 
meaning for human beings and therefore human action is meaningful […] it has a 
meaning for them and they act on the basis of the meanings that they attribute to 
their acts and to the acts of others” (Ibid: 30). Therefore, in order to uncover and 
understand this, a researcher in social science need to interpret these acts and the 
social reality within which they occur in a subjective manner in order to acquire 
the most accurate understanding.  
In this study, interpretivism is important because it facilitates the understanding of 
human actions and ascribed meanings, however, what is often forgotten and not 
emphasized enough is the importance of positivism since it provides causal 
explanations to questions of why something is the way it is. Therefore, positivists 
believe reality is static and a given because it’s inherent to the human nature, 
whilst the interpretivist subjectively interprets reality to understand it. Thus, in 
this study I posit the question of ‘has the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah 
changed over time and why?’ which necessitates a philosophical outlook on 
reality that is situated somewhere in between consolidating the other6.  
The thorough understanding of ontological and epistemological positions whilst 
conducting a research study is of significant relevance to direct the general 
orientation. However, Hughes and Sharrock (1997) considers researchers to be 
pragmatists and advice to  
 
“Not worry about epistemology and ontology but about the particular 
problems they confront from their theories and investigations […] If 
all that matters is that scientists go about their business […] using 
methods appropriate to the problems they have to deal with, then 
philosophical worries about ontology and epistemology are an 
irrelevance”(94). 
 
Following Hughes and Sharrock’s line of argument, for a pragmatist it’s difficult 
to disregard or down-size the importance of the philosophical approaches, since 
they are more concerned with finding a suitable method for approaching a 
research problem it would seem imperative to ensure such methodological 
applicability by justifying the relevance of the ontological and epistemological 
stance. Hence, for any researcher conducting a study it’s important to be aware of 
the philosophical standpoints as they provide a general orient to the way in which 
to approach a scientific problem and add great scientific support to the 
                                                
6 For a more interesting discussion on the consolidation of the two theoretical frameworks with 
contrasting epistemologies; interpretivism and positivism, see Price, R. and Reus-Smit, C. (1998).  
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applicability of a method, which could have a significant effect on the results of 
the study. 
2.2 Theoretical Considerations 
Furthermore, I will essentially apply a combination of Alexander Wendt’s theory 
of Social Constructivism within International Relations and Kenneth Waltz’s 
Neorealism, which is considered helpful in answering if the EU’s attitude towards 
Hezbollah has changed over time and why. The reason is that both approaches 
revolve around the fundamental principle that there is an inherent state of anarchy; 
a society without the existence of a world government, in the international system 
and that states are not the absolute key actors in global politics. The principle is 
highly relevant within the multipolar international system that we are currently 
living in. Social constructivism in particular, would help clarify the broader 
context behind the apparent change in EU’s attitude toward Hezbollah over time. 
Therefore, in this section I will relay the core assumptions of the two theoretical 
conceptions and discuss their necessary applicability in this research study. 
2.2.1 Neorealism    
Neorealism, also termed structural realism, was first coined by Kenneth Waltz and 
is a nuanced departure from the classical realist assumptions that has dominated 
the field of International Relations for quite some time. In his book Theory of 
International Politics (1979), Waltz advocates a systemic approach that facilitates 
the study of state behaviour change, and subsequently emphasizes the 
international structure that function as a form of constriction on state behaviour; 
strategies and motivations. There are six foundational concepts inherent to 
Neorealism, which will be discussed: structure, anarchy, capability, and 
distribution of power, polarity and national interest. Many of the mentioned 
concepts have been widely discussed in different adaptations by realist thinkers 
within the discipline of International Relations (Jervis 1997; Mearsheimer 2001; 
Waltz 1979; Snyder 2002; Buzan, Jones & Little 1993). 
 
Furthermore, Neorealists argue that the international structure is characterized by 
anarchy; which refers to “the absence of a world government” and not the 
existence of chaos and disorder (Waltz 1979: 88), and state capabilities, which 
predominantly addresses the notion of polar, bipolar or even a multipolar 
international system. Classical realist assumptions are not discussed in a lengthy 
manner in his book; however, Waltz disagrees with Hans Morgenthau, one of the 
prominent realist thinkers, who failed to conceive the influential importance of the 
international political system as distinguished from its inherent units; state, 
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bureaucracy and individual level analysis, when emphasizing the steering 
elements of a foreign policy (Waltz 2008: 71). Thus, according to Waltz, the 
framework within which other numeral causes occur is the structural formation of 
the international system (Hollis & Steve 2000: 853). With that said, anarchy, 
according to both classical realists and neorealist, exists within the international 
structure within which each state is independent in its actions without a global 
government restricting its behaviour. The state of anarchy dictates that every state 
to its own, meaning that a state can only depend on its own abilities, which 
renders the issue of security to be a vital aspect for a state (Mingst 2004: 66). 
Additionally, they are of the same opinion concerning the state as a central actor 
in the international system and naturally revolve around inter-state relations. 
Consequently, non-state actors and multi-national corporations (MNCs) are less 
important and not as central as states are, however, Neorealists agree that non-
state actors exist and do play a role within the international system and Hezbollah 
is an example of this (Jackson and Sorensen 2007: 60).  
 
According to neo-realists, states acting rationally are a key notion whilst, classical 
realists claim this cannot be ensured (Forde 1995: 145). Thus, due to the 
“everyone to themselves” notion, states will feel threatened by other actors, which 
is where the aspect of capabilities becomes important. States’ capabilities that are 
vital when protecting oneself in the face of a threat, are divided into multiple 
levels of capability within the international structure so to distinguish between 
states at various different points in time (Dunne & Schmidt 2014:104). Hence, the 
more threatened a state feels, the larger will the incentive be for acquiring more 
capabilities and ensure security; i.e. security dilemma, which results in an endless 
cycle of competitiveness. The “rank-ordering of states” or competing for 
maximizing security is contingent upon power being distributed differently, or 
capabilities if you will (Ibid: 104-105), which as Waltz (1989) contends: “power 
is a means to the end of security […] and because power is a possibly useful 
means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it” (Waltz 1989: 
40 cited in Dunne & Schmidt 2014:105). The concept of power is thus an inherent 
characteristic of the international structure and is comprised of a state’s capability 
and its differing and changing distribution amongst states (Waltz 1990: 36).  
 
Furthermore, the concept of polarity in the international structure is defined by the 
varying degree of capabilities distributed amongst states, which results in the 
establishment of the nature of the international system that are; unipolarity, 
bipolarity and multipolarity. The first distinction entails the superiority of a 
singular state in the international system; secondly, bipolarity signifies the 
existence of two superior powers compared to other states with regards to 
military, economic, technological, wealth and production capabilities, and thirdly, 
multipolarity refers to when more than two actors have similar capabilities (Buzan 
2013:156). Similarly to Neorealists, Alexander Wendt (1999) assumes that  
“international social structures are built around relationships of enemy, rival and 
friend” (Wendt cited in Buzan 2013: 157)
  17 
excluded by Neorealists and supposes that polarity is the focal point with regards 
to political and military security. Distinct changes happen when bipolarity or 
unipolarity occurs, and when there are more actors than two, states depend on 
their own capabilities and/or on the formation of alliances with other actors. 
Additionally, this also results in the competitiveness among actors in a multipolar 
system, like the current international system we are residing in, which renders it 
increasingly ambiguous when calculating the capabilities of the actors and 
evaluating strength of alliances (Waltz 2000: 6). The multipolarity of the 
international system is highly relevant today with various actors with distinct 
capabilities, such as Hezbollah challenging states such as the US and France, with 
alliances with Iran, Hezbollah gains additional capability that dictate state 
behaviour. France is a distinguished European state with regards to Hezbollah due 
to its colonial ties with Lebanon and its continuous support for the Lebanese 
government and therefore, it is assumed that France would influence the EU’s 
attitude since it lies within their interest to concern themselves with the stability 
and well-being of Lebanon. According to Hezbollah, after the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister in February 2005, France has become 
increasingly anti-Syrian, which has, in the eyes of Hezbollah, set France apart 
from other EU states (Atrissi 2007: 94). Hence, this contributes to the 
competitiveness of maximizing security for many actors such as the US and the 
European states, as it does with the increase of Hezbollah terror operations both in 
Europe and around the world, which correlates to Waltz’s expectation that 
multipolar system will not be as stable as in a bipolar international systems, and 
that interdependence will most likely increase in a multipolar system (Elman 
2008: 19).  
 
The concept of national interest is somewhat obscure; however, in relation to 
safeguarding a state’s territory, economic development and military ability, it is 
considered a national interest when endeavouring to develop these capabilities. 
The level of capability can also be considered a constriction or provide the 
impetus to strive for those national interest. Hence, as Telhami (2003) argues the 
incentive for a state to pursue its interests is determined by its own capabilities 
(109). Furthermore, the way states behave can be due to interstate competitiveness 
because it is in their calculated interest to do so, and it can additionally be the 
result of interstate socialization, meaning that it is considered to be within a state’s 
interest to follow certain rules or standards (Elman 2008: 18).              
2.2.2 Social Constructivism 
As of late years, the Social Constructivist theory developed within International 
Relations with the aim of explicating the increasing new developments arising on 
the international arena (Knutsen 1997: 1), due to constructivists claiming that the 
theoretical frameworks available such as liberalism, realism etc. lack to 
comprehensively provide explanations for the new developments in world 
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politics. Similarly, as Steve Smith (2001: 225) concurringly argues, “…this has 
been necessary because of a changing world” with the fall of the Soviet Union in 
the 1990s and the largest EU enlargement to date are just a few world 
developments, which renders a new lens necessary in order to better understand 
the new global order. One of the leading scholars who have elevated the 
application of Social Constructivism within International Relations is Alexander 
Wendt and his idea that international politics is fundamentally constituted by 
shared knowledge and ideas. Fundamental constructivist concepts are discourses, 
norms, socialization and identity, all of which I will touch upon. Wendt argues 
that power politics is not a materialistic phenomenon as Neorealists would claim, 
but is constructed in a social manner, and therefore subject to change by human 
practices (Wendt 1992), thus providing a new and social understanding of 
International Relations. Wendt (1999: 1) contends, “…the identities and interests 
of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by 
nature”, which naturally makes individuals dependent on the socially constructed 
structure.  
 
Within the international system and relations, constructivists consider states to be 
very important actors, central if anything, with the aptitude to act in a defensive or 
an offensive mode. States’ offensiveness usually has a distinct bearing on other 
states and its interactions that potentially could generate violent factions and 
terrorist groups states ultimately need to face (Wendt 1999: 9). Henceforth, Social 
Constructivists do place an importance on non-state actors and/or social 
movements as they are viewed as the consequences of states’ inability to meet 
certain requirements (Scott 1991 cited in Foweraker 1995: 10). Thus, the activities 
of non-state actors can have significant impact on international politics. Ideas that 
constitute structures of the international system are viewed from materialist and 
idealist point of view. Materialism refers to the crude form of material forces such 
as production and arms capabilities, natural resources and the importance of a 
state’s geography, which carry certain significance as they can be used to endow 
capabilities to some as well as cultivating threats. On the other hand, idealists are 
of the opinion that the structuring of the social consciousness; i.e. the diffusion of 
knowledge and ideas, usually is constituted as norms or rules. Hence, the social 
structures are significant since they are comprised of interests and identities. Thus, 
according to idealists actors attribute materialist forces with meaning and it is only 
then that they are considered significant (Wendt 1999: 23-24). The level of 
importance given is based on the shared ideas of others and oneself. Idealists posit 
that social constructions are what they are due to the shared ideas and conceptions 
of material forces and human activity (Wendt 1995: 73). 
 
According to Social Constructivists, they concur with Neorealists that there exists 
a state of anarchy in the international structure; however, it is not considered a 
condition of the structure because it is perpetually defined by rational and social 
interactions of states (Wendt 1992: 397-398). The identity of actors is formed 
through the international structure and is in turn institutionalized because it is 
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within an actor’s, a state or non-state actor, interest. The interests dictate actors’ 
preferences and its perpetual alteration continuously reshape the system and the 
anarchic structure. Thus, anarchy is as Wendt states “An empty vessel, without 
intrinsic meaning. What gives anarchy its meaning are the kinds of people who 
live there and the structure of their relationships” (Wendt 1999: 309). 
Furthermore, Wendt contends that anarchy has three potential structures that 
govern within the international system, which are friend, rival and enemy. 
Anarchy can signify interstate cooperation, competitiveness and rivalry, and the 
perpetual fight between enemies in pursuit of superiority (Ibid: 247-249). These 
anarchic structures enable cooperation between states due to the internalization of 
specific common beliefs and ideas as either friends or rivals characterizing the 
international system, hence, excluding the structure of enmity (Ibid: 259). 
Constructivists are of the same opinion as Neorealists and Classical Realists that 
states endeavour to survive, though constructivists argue that the use of violence 
or force is not necessarily the way to acquire such survival (Weber 2009: 67). The 
characterization of an enmity structure in the international system, according to 
Realists, would dictate that no cooperation is possible due to the constant threat 
perception and the distrustfulness of thy neighbour, whilst, constructivists would 
conversely claim that as the international system can go insofar as be 
characterized as friendly or rival at most it would therefore enable a form of 
anarchic cooperation for the reason that it is states that define the meaning of 
anarchy at any point in time when interstate socialization occurs (Wendt 1999: 
253-255).   
 
Due to social constructions only being able to be identified in the continuity of 
social interactions and practices, it can therefore be applicable to a variety of 
historical occurrences, and consequently, could very well be used when 
understanding whether the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over 
time as it can offer a clarification of the broader context behind this change and 
thus give indications of why such a change has occurred. Additionally, 
Constructivism adds useful views on how power is translated through actors, and 
as Wendt contends, “Ideas always matter, since power and interest do not have 
effects apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such” (Wendt 
1995: 73-74). Moreover, Neorealist scholar Mearsheimer argues that social 
structures inherent to an international system allow for actions to occur by 
attributing actors with particular preferences and characteristics simultaneously 
providing material forces with distinct significance. Wendt agrees with 
Mearsheimer’s view to a certain extent, however, the constant redefinition and 
duplication of the structure’s characteristic and the effect they have is not dealt 
with. Thus, if a state or a non-state actor militarize or act violently, this will result 
in other states defining that state as a threat, which will thus affect the entire 
international structure creating new attitudes resulting in a security dilemma 
where, as Wendt states, “they are effects of practice” (Wendt 1995: 76-77). 
Furthermore, Wendt argues, “It is only through the interaction of actors that the 
structure of the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes 
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transformed (Wendt 1999: 366), thus indicating the possibility of change. The 
continuous socialization that helps identify the role of power facilitates the 
understanding of “how ideational structures shape the very way actors define 
themselves- who they are, their goals and the roles they believe they should play” 
(Copeland 2000: 190). The relation between discourse and power is intrinsically 
important and cannot, or should not, be disregarded as Foucault has discussed 
lengthy in his acclaimed work7. Power is a pivotal aspect in the continuous 
redefining, refining and reproducing of practices of social constructions, 
irrespective of being recognized or not, because it is perpetually an inherent part 
of the communicative exchanges important for social constructivist scholars. 
                                                
7 See Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: the birth of a prison and Foucault, M. (1998). The 
History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge. 
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3 Methodological Framework 
3.1 Research Design  
In a study, it is of paramount importance to carefully consider the appropriate 
research design and the way of approaching it, so that it is in alignment with the 
aims of the research project. This study will involve the investigation of a single 
case. George and Bennett (2005) argue that a research design consists of 
executing five tasks important for studies employing the method of case study. 
These tasks will act as guidance while conducting this study, and will now briefly 
be introduced. The premier task discusses the single most important aspect in a 
research design, the formulating and specifying the objective of the study and 
identifying a problem worth investigating (George & Bennett 2005:74). As King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1996: 15) argue, a research project ought to “pose a question 
that is important in the real world” and contribute to scholarly works by providing 
“scientific explanations of some aspect of the world”.  
 
Furthermore, George & Bennett (2005) identify numeral theory-building research 
objectives and the disciplined configurative form of case study will be utilized as 
it corresponds to the aim of this study. Disciplined configurative denotes the use 
of already established theoretical assumptions in order to explicate the end-result 
of a research puzzle (Ibid: 75). The subsequent task is the specification of 
variables. In order to do so, the dependent variable and the independent variables 
need to be identified to explain why the specific outcome has emerged (Ibid: 79-
80). In this study, the dependent variable is identified as EU’s changed attitude 
towards Hezbollah, which corroborates with the aim of the study, which is 
whether the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time. And the 
independent variables that can potentially explain this change is Hezbollah’s 
activities, France’s colonial ties and close relationship with Lebanon can act 
influential in a change of attitude, and the influence of the US on EU attitudes. 
The following task addresses the aspect of case selection, which ought to be “an 
integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the 
study” (Ibid: 83). George and Bennett (2005) further state the central aim with 
regards to case selection is its significance to the aim of the research. Thus, within 
this study choosing to investigate if and why EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah has 
changed over time, which will indicate whether the EU is reactive, is of central 
importance as this epitomizes the overarching objective of the research. The 
fourth task important to the research design is the consideration of the variance in 
the selected variables. The vital question is how many or few categories are 
  22 
chosen that entail the required carefulness, and yet maintain the depth of 
descriptions (Ibid: 85). When it comes to the independent variables, I will look at 
indicators for measurement; Hezbollah’s activities will be analysed by the 
increase of violent activities Hezbollah executes or participates in based on their 
interest; France implicitly or explicitly expressing opinion in the media, where it 
is the easiest platform to express opinion, upon which the EU afterwards 
expresses similar opinion which would serve as an indicator for France’s 
influence as it is guided by their national interest to act in a certain way; and the 
same goes for measuring the US’s influence on EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah, 
who then implicitly or explicitly says something as it lies within their interest to 
which the EU says something in similar line. Thus, these variables are derived 
mainly from the theoretical framework of Neorealism employed in this study.  
 
In this paper, web searches will be conducted on the particular events the EU has 
issued statements about; searching relevant key words and corresponding dates, to 
see whether the US or France has relayed their opinion on the event in question 
and to see if it contrasts with EU’s attitude. It will be assumed that if 
representatives from either the US or France haven’t spoken in the media about 
Hezbollah on a particular event, it is the assumption that they in fact concur with 
the EU and thereby doesn’t need to influence the EU’s attitude towards 
Hezbollah. Hence, that is considered the most pragmatic and apt way to uncover 
which explanation is the most likely one. The media platform is the most available 
and freely expressive forum where state representatives’ opinions are conveyed, 
because it’s fairly difficult to find official documentation where France or the US 
candidly or willingly states its opinion on Hezbollah. The final task refers to the 
formulation of data requirements obtained from the empirical material collected or 
analysed. Consequently, this is essential whether a researcher employs a single 
case or numerous, in order to make it comparable to other cases in other studies 
the requirements need to be identical (Ibid: 86). Hence, the data acquired from the 
empirical material is guided by the theoretical assumptions discussed extensively 
in this study.   
3.1.1 A Qualitative Study 
A qualitative analysis will be carried out because it enables one to understand how 
meanings are formulated and their continuous altering characteristic and its 
multiple ways of application. It’s imperative to keep in mind when analysing a 
text to “approach it through understanding the context of its production by the 
analysts themselves” (May 2001:193). Furthermore, Alvesson and Sköldberg 
(2009:272) contend, “Interpretation implies that there are no self-evident, simple 
or unambiguous rules or procedures and those crucial ingredients are the 
researcher’s judgment, intuition, and ability to ‘see and point something out’...” 
An inherent attribute to qualitative analysis is the notion of reflexivity, which 
denotes the recognition of your own subjective stance with regards to the issue of 
  23 
investigation, ergo, instituting awareness and approaching a text in a critical 
fashion (Ibid: 9-10). Thus in this study, the qualitative aspect will guide the 
analytical understanding of the process and the social context within which the 
communicative acts occurred.   
3.1.2 The Method of Case Study 
In this study, I will predominantly utilize the method of case study as it, according 
to Bryman’s categorization (2004), involves a single case. Accordingly, this 
generates questions concerning what this study is a case of (Collier 1995:465). In 
this study, it is a case of a common approach by an international actor’s attitudes 
towards sub-state actors. Guided by my research questions, this would specifically 
mean investigating the discursive constructions through linguistics employed by 
the EU in official statements and declarations and in analysing if and why there 
has been a change in the EU’s discursive constructions of Hezbollah. 
Furthermore, it is a case of a particular faction’s altering approach towards a 
transnational organization and what’s conducive to such alteration. When 
employing the method of case study, it essentially seeks to study a specific social 
phenomenon within its contextual framework for purposes of comprehension (Yin 
1994 cited in Woodside 2010:1). George and Bennett (2005:18) construe a case 
study to be “a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator 
selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself.” Thereby, this 
demarcation signifies a difficulty, if possible at all, to investigate all aspects 
associated to the specific study and research questions at hand; the EU and all 
associated links to Hezbollah. Therefore, the research questions posited are 
pertinent in the guidance and considerations of the scope of limitations this study 
carries.   
 
Case study methods offer a very distinguished level of conceptual validity; the 
ability to recognize and measure indicators that most accurately epitomize the 
theoretical concepts meant to be measured (George & Bennett 2005:19). Several 
variables are not easy to measure, which is why researchers must conduct 
“contextualized comparison”, that “self-consciously seeks to address the issue of 
equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena- even if 
expressed in substantively different terms- across different contexts” (Locke & 
Thelen 1998:11). These exhaustive considerations are necessary when identifying 
intra-contextual factors, and are customary in case studies, however, exceedingly 
arduous in statistical investigations (George & Bennett 2005:19). Additionally, 
case studies provide the opportunity to, in an in-depth fashion, analyse the causal 
mechanisms’ function under specific conditions. Lastly, in case studies the causal 
complexity offers, for example, the possibility of reaching conditional 
generalizations by a variety of potential means. Nevertheless, despite case studies 
demanding a more extensive process tracing of evidence to detail such intricate 
dealings, there is a significant value in such comprehensive studies (Ibid: 21-22).  
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Furthermore, this study seeks to answer two questions, a “has/what/how” question 
and a “why” question. Even though, the “has/what/how”-questions commonly 
contain a descriptive element, and are not that ostentatious they, nevertheless, 
shouldn’t be underestimated. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 15) assert the 
knowledge and facts acquired when answering the “has/what/how”-question is 
necessarily conducive and foundational when answering the why-question. It is 
along that line of descriptive and explanatory case that my study is situated. 
Furthermore, Hollis and Smith (1990) seemingly discuss that where societal 
issues are concerned two sides of a story is to be told. The outsider version is an 
attempt to generate generalizations of the natural science nature pursuing to 
explain, whilst the insider aims to understand how and what something is. Hollis 
and Smith are supposedly implying, and convincingly enough, the consolidation 
of the two disciplines: 
 
“The actors’ view is a starting point and, advocates of Understanding will 
say, the only starting point. We must know how actors defined the issues 
and the alternatives, what they believed about the situation and each other, 
what they aimed to achieve, and how. Only then can we ask more pointed 
questions about their clarity of vision, their underlying reasons, and the true 
meaning of the episodes.” (2).  
 
However, Hollis and Smith (1990) quite surprisingly and questionably, argue in 
fact the impossibility of such amalgamation due to the different comprehension of 
the social world and the human nature. Therefore, I am well aware of the hot 
debated consolidation of positing a has/what/ how-question in a combination of a 
why-question nevertheless, by seeing the great value in firstly understanding the 
nature of something in order to explain why it is that way, I choose to apply this 
amalgamation. Thus, easily put, I believe that you can’t explain why something is 
a certain way, if you don’t know what or how it is in the first place.  
3.2 Discourse Analysis: The Linguistic Approach 
In this study, I intend to investigate the discursive constructions of the EU with 
regards to Hezbollah during selected years where the referencing to Hezbollah is 
explicit and forceful, which will thus indicate if the EU’s attitude towards 
Hezbollah has changed and why. There are many ways of studying discourses, 
both in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or as Teun a. van D Dijk terms it 
Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and is dependent on a number of factors; aim of 
the research study, the empirical data, the interests and ability of the researcher as 
well as the limitations of the research project (Dijk 2008: 2-3). Therefore, to 
conduct this study, the method of CDA or CDS, if you will, will be employed in 
order to acquire an understanding of the language utilized by focusing on the 
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semantics, pragmatics and style; inherent to positive and negative expressions of 
the declarations and statements issued by the EU. Thereinafter, analyse whether 
the discursive constructions of the EU’s attitudes towards Hezbollah has changed 
over time and why. Discourse analysis is employed because it is viewed as the 
most suitable method when analysing the various positive or negative wordings 
and sentences within context that is given specific meaning which then 
interpretative narratives can provide a greater understanding of whether and why 
EU’s discursive constructions of EU’s attitudes towards Hezbollah has changed 
over time. Combining this method with the more explanatory ambitions in this 
study when answering the question of why EU’s attitudes has changed over time 
is considered most applicable because the contextual interpretations is always 
required when conducting an analysis in a rational way, especially since it 
correlates with the aim of the study and helps when answering my research 
question.  
 
The meaning attributed to a word, sentence, an entire paragraph or text is 
commonly denoted to as the study of semantics, which ranges from views and 
attitudes to the definitiveness of decision making (Fairclough 2001:5). Pragmatics 
entails the study of the contextual milieu within which the meaning attributed to a 
word or situation and the influential characteristics the milieu has on those 
ascribed meanings (Chilton 2004:48). Moreover, an additional component of 
linguistics is stylistics or style that pertains to the selection of words employed by 
the author or publisher of the text and the use of lyrical and assonance in word 
formulations, the nifty use of parallels to establish a differentiation, the inter-
changing of sentences on the basis of a changeable audience in order to emphasize 
certain expressions or statements, or simply the formal and informal aspects of 
style in communicative acts (Dijk 1983:24). Lastly, I will employ positive and 
negative expressions to demonstrate the perceived attitude of the EU towards the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, which will help ascertain, at least the official, European 
attitude towards Hezbollah. It is important to be aware that the use of specific 
words with ascribed significance is used to influence and situate words in either 
positive or negative inference (Dijk 2008:80).  
3.2.1 Words and Expressions 
In this paper, I will mainly look for certain words and expressions that indicate a 
more forceful attitude in EU statements. They are the use of adjectives such as 
strongly, deeply, utmost, strongest (possible) terms and often the amalgamated 
use of condemns, deplores, vicious, killings, assassination, tragedy, disintegration, 
“need”, “must” and “should”. The words’ and expressions’ frequency and 
increasing use in the same context as Hezbollah is mentioned will indicate change.  
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3.3 Discourse Analysis: The Communicative 
Approach 
The method of discourse analysis is commonly regarded as various acts of 
communication, both in the form of speech or in written texts, which transpires in 
an interactive act of influence between the reader and the author (Mills 1997:2-4). 
Discursive acts occur in light of text or speech reproduction by a different person 
inscribing their personal use of language and opinions conducive to 
communicating information with specific objectives (Ibid: 5). Furthermore, 
Michel Foucault (1972 cited in Mills 1997:6-7) contends that the communicative 
act ascribed significance to it have influential characteristics on social 
interactions, which renders it entitled to be considered a form of discourse.   
In any form of communication, certain significance is attributed and transferred 
between the producers of the communication, whether in the form of speech or in 
written texts, and the receiver and/or interpreter within the specific milieu of its 
deliverance and language. Chimombo and Roseberry (1998) argue that the 
concept of power is an integral part of that unique inter-relation from the time a 
text is produced and the receiver(s) who conduct their interpretations of said text 
(307-308). It is also important to address media discourse as a central and 
valuable channel in continuous modification, reviewing and revision that 
comprise of the audience’s different social realities and is intersubjective in the 
sense that it continuously diffuses meanings that down the line develops into 
common knowledge and mutual significance (Ibid: 317 & Talbot, 2007: 3-4).  
 
Furthermore, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) focuses 
primarily on studying the occurrence of change. The actual use of language 
derives from previous discursive constructions and the producers of 
communication, with the use of language, utilize the previously ascribed 
meanings, which is what Fairclough’s concept of intertextuality entails. Hence,  
 
“It is by combining elements from different discourses that concrete 
language use can change the individual discourses and thereby, also, 
the social and cultural world. Through analysis of intertextuality, one 
can investigate both the reproduction of discourses whereby no new 
elements are introduced and discursive change through new 
combinations of discourse” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 7).  
 
It is important to have the concept of intertextuality in mind because it could help 
identify and deduce significant interpretations concerning the EU’s linguistic use 
and by extension their approach towards Hezbollah and their actions. 
Furthermore, intertextuality is helpful when investigating why such a change in 
reference to Hezbollah has occurred when having identified previous discourses 
and identifying new ones.       
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In this research study, it’s important to discuss the notion of political discourse, as 
it is an integral part when analysing political texts and understanding both how 
EU’s discourse of Hezbollah is constructed and why those discursive 
constructions have changed. Firstly, it’s important to define what I mean by 
political discourse, since it can both be a discourse, which in itself is political in 
nature, and a discourse, which is political but there are no direct reference to 
anything political, in way of substance or context wise. Therefore, political 
discourse is defined here as focusing principally on formal and informal contexts, 
political actors, among others political institutions, governments and media 
(Wilson 2001:398). In political discourses, as in other discourses the goal is to 
persuade the interpreting audience and in order to do so ethos, pathos and logos 
are key. Firstly, ethos concerns the individual features, authenticity and credibility 
as well as the use of terminology and sentences (Metcalfe 2012: 297), secondly, 
pathos signifies the allure and appeal to the audiences’ emotions by making 
analogies and relating to issues of significant importance to the interpreter (Ibid: 
299), and thirdly, logos is a term referred to when employing reasonable 
argumentations and evidence to strengthen one’s claims (Ibid: 205-206). 
3.3.1 The Relation between Discourse and Power   
In social interactions, the concept of power is essentially defined as control that 
occurs when controlling others’ actions and such power is exercised in the form of 
speeches or writing texts. Hence, the author in that position controls the discursive 
line of communication. The relation between discourse and power is important to 
discuss because in various communicative lines; i.e. discourses, occur within the 
EU and it is essentially where power and knowledge intersect and is deflected in 
the political and social life. Hence, power is inherent to various communicative 
acts; words and sentences, and, therefore, cannot be disregarded in the course of 
conducting a discursive analysis. Discourse has become a way of communication 
by various influential actors; political actors, the governments and the public 
media, thus resulting in power being enmeshed in the discourse becoming one and 
sometimes difficult to separate (Dijk 2008: 9). As Francis Bacon (1597) once said 
knowledge is power (“scientia potestas est”), which would prove accurate if 
actions are controlled which would influence the actors’ personal opinions and 
beliefs, and then by extension being in control of the knowledge of social actors 
endows those authoring the communicative discourses in combination with its 
influential contextual milieu (Dijk 2008: 10). Chilton (2004) stipulates the 
importance of power in the way of its acquisition and ways of keeping it is mainly 
by using reason, persuasion and/or manipulation (3). In exchanges of 
communication; whether in speech or in writing, control and power is usually 
procured by enunciation and/or repetition with reasoned argumentation, and 
sometimes in combination with a nifty twist drawing the reader into your speech 
or text (Dijk 2008:37-38). Furthermore, in various forms of text; statements, 
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declarations or reports, the exercise of power can occur when limiting the 
substance of a text, which essentially means preferring particular understandings 
of an issue and phrasing it in a specific way. This would be construed as a hidden 
form of power that would correspond with the intention and aim of the author 
(Fairclough 2001: 43). 
3.4 Textual Analysis 
In its crude form, textual analysis is a qualitative method of collecting information 
about the perceived reality we live in and is useful for studying material of 
communication. Hence, as Alan McKee (2003) relays it “when we perform textual 
analysis on a text, we make an educated guess at some of the most likely 
interpretations that might be made of that text” (1). The applied method for 
conducting the second part of the analysis addressing the explanatory factors for 
the EU’s changed attitude towards Hezbollah over time will be a form of 
interpretative research that is concerned with understanding why a particular 
process has unfolded over the course of time (Bhattacherjee 2012:106). The 
employed data collection technique is documentation, which means external and 
internal documents such as the public statements and articles, which are then used 
to make educated analytical interpretations based on the gathered and previously 
analysed data concerning whether EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah has changed 
over time (107). This is a suitable way of analysing possible explanations for why 
EU’s attitude has changed because “texts are the material traces that are left of the 
practice of sense-making- the only empirical evidence we have of how other 
people make sense of the world” (McKee 2003:15).   
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4 Analysis 
4.1 The EU’s Changed Attitude over Time 
4.1.1 1983  
Lebanon saw itself in the midst of war that erupted in 1975, the Ten, which was 
what the EU referred to itself when it comprised of Ten Member States, stated 
“they call upon all parties to respect the integrity of Lebanon and the authority of 
its government” which means to signify several involved parties in the Civil War 
(Appendix: Statement 1). The EU addressed eruptions of violence and death 
occurring in Lebanon in the midst of the civil war, which is an expected response 
by the EU but does not use forceful words such as “condemn” or “deplore”. The 
EU’s use of the term “all parties” signifies the implicit call to Hezbollah amongst 
Syrian, Palestinian and Israeli factions to behave in a responsible manner and 
“appeal for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of violence and 
pressure in Lebanon” meaning that Hezbollah is perceived as one of the factions 
employing violence, which according to the EU, would be a “tragedy” and 
possibly result in the “disintegration” of Lebanon. Despite, the overall tone of the 
EU being rather inexpressive the selection of words such as “tragedy” and 
“disintegration” of Lebanon is heavy and in some ways heart wrenching, 
something that Hezbollah is perceivably contributing to. What is more, the 
statement by the Ten is intentionally cautious when refraining from explicitly 
mentioning Hezbollah and not using the word “deploring”, as the European 
parliament did in the same month where they “…deplored the attacks perpetrated 
against soldiers of the multinational peace-keeping force…” (Appendix: 
Statement 2).  
 
The non-explicit attitude expressed in the language of the statement issued in 
November 1983 with reference to the threat of force in the Middle East that “…all 
those concerned to put an immediate halt to the fighting and let reason and 
moderation prevail” indicate EU’s moderately expressive tone as they instead of 
using “condemn” the phrase “deeply concerned” is preferably employed 
(Appendix: Statement 3). Simultaneously, it should be considered due to the civil 
war at the time and the numeral factions involved, interpretations of who did what 
in the war could be slightly troublesome to ascertain. However, indications made 
in previous statement by the EU show, in its contextual frame, that Hezbollah are 
positively one of the implied factions. The term employed by the EU, “all those 
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concerned” conveys a slightly cavalier tone, which seems somewhat out of place 
and a much more firm and determined tone would be expected with war and 
civilian causalities. Even so, the EU with traditionally a culture of condemning 
any act of violence and thus, failing to adhere to EU values such as human rights, 
rule of law, freedom of expression amongst others, would be expected to provide 
a statement of more strength and condemnation. Yet, the EU could be interpreted 
to be just enough concerned and supporting as to not add pressure to the violent 
fighting and have it deteriorate further.        
4.1.2 1985  
The EU expresses concern especially for the southern population in Lebanon that 
are “…subjected to unjustifiable acts of violence” that cannot be condoned 
irrespective of whomever is carrying out the violence and uses the phrase 
“continue to view” which is not forceful enough (Appendix: Statement 4). In 
alignment with the “Israeli Government’s decision to withdraw its forces”, the EU 
determinately adheres to the UN Security Council resolutions that explicitly 
request the withdrawal “…of other forces which are not there at the request of the 
Lebanese Government”. Thus, this elevates the multiple interferences by foreign 
forces; the Syrians, the Israelis and Hezbollah, who are not there per request by 
the Lebanese government, as Hezbollah in 1985 wasn’t yet considered a 
legitimate Lebanese force (Alagha 2006: 41). The EU specifically emphasizes the 
need for “…security arrangements be reached between the Israel and Lebanese 
Governments”, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties surrounding 
such encounters considering Hezbollah’s perpetual opposition as it would 
compromise its raison d’être and go against everything Hezbollah and its patron 
Iran represents (Gaub 2013:7-8). Moreover, the EU uses the traditional term “all 
the parties concerned” wherein Hezbollah is implicitly included, “both within 
Lebanon and outside”, as well as both Syrian and Israeli forces (Appendix: 
Statement 4). The EU refers to them in a formal manner that neither provides 
impetus to think twice as a faction or change the violent approach groups have 
resorted to. The EU is using very apprehensive and implicit terms when referring 
to Hezbollah which could in one way be perceived as the EU, at this point in time, 
needing to fully understand Hezbollah’s role and interests, as they only recently 
emerged in the beginning of the 1980s (Alagha 2006: 13), without assigning 
blame. 
 
EU’s cautious use of words is persistent but there is a tone of worry for the 
“deteriorating situation in Lebanon” and the clashes developing more seriously 
resulting in that “whole populations are leaving their homes” (Appendix: 
Statement 5). Hezbollah is still not mentioned explicitly but implicitly in the EU’s 
“…appeal to all parties concerned…” which is issued in the context of the EU 
advocating the necessity of a national reconciliation by encouraging 
communication among the Lebanese factions. 
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4.1.3 1988  
The EU continues to refer to Hezbollah in an implicit manner by the term “all 
parties” which within the context of the civil war can be considered an apt and 
suitable way to formulate a response (Appendix: Statement 6). The meaning 
attributed to that term; “all parties” can be perceived as a “just enough” use of 
words that keeps within the line of expected response in the midst of war. 
Furthermore, the EU again condemn terrorism as iterated in both statement 5 and 
6 and is further highlighted in statement 7 held at the Western Economic Summit 
where the EU “strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all its form, 
including the taking of hostages” which refers to the increasing hostage-taking 
particularly in Lebanon and the region (Mannes 2004: 172) merely a week after 
the EU issued a statement on Lebanon and the hostage situation, but still does not 
use those forceful words like “condemn” with an explicit reference to Hezbollah 
(Appendix: Statement 6). Additionally, the EU stating explicitly in statement 7 
that “terrorists must not go unpunished” and the EU will fight it through “the 
application of rule of law, the policy of no concessions to terrorists and their 
sponsors” shows the EU’s negative and disapproving attitude towards 
kidnappings. 
4.1.4 1989  
The EU addresses Hezbollah, yet again, in an implicit manner; “all parties 
involved” (Appendix: Statement 8). What is interesting is that the EU mentions 
Iran in a statement on Lebanon, stipulating that it has “expressed its hope that the 
Iranian leaders will prove, by concrete actions, their willingness to develop 
constructive relations with the Community and its Member States, on the basis of 
freedom, tolerance and respect for international law”. Iran is perceived to have a 
special interest in the developments in Lebanon, which can be understood through 
their relation with and supporter of Hezbollah through the perceived assumption 
by the EU that Lebanon is in reality affected by this relationship. The EU 
mentioning Iran for the first time in a statement about Lebanon indicates the 
acknowledgement that Iranian ties are certainly influential in Lebanon and could 
be key when resolving the political and security situation in Lebanon (Ibid). 
Additionally, the fact that the EU emphasizes the need for leaders of Iran to 
engage in relations with the EU with values of freedom, tolerance and respect for 
international law implies the shared EU understanding that Iran fails to operate 
and uphold similar democratic aspirations, which are highly foundational in the 
EU (Kausch 2009:130). This distinction renders the perceived understanding of 
the EU being different from Iran, and thereby, Hezbollah as its ally and “student” 
since they share the same ideology and is an extension of the other signifying a 
sense of ‘othering’; ‘us versus them’ the EU is subtly conveying. In addition, 
contextually the Ta’if accords were agreed upon due to Hezbollah strong-arming 
the negotiations and through means of pressure and Syrian support the Lebanese 
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government legitimized Hezbollah and as a Lebanese resistance force, thus 
circumventing the classification of militia and keeping their arms and weapons 
(Alagha 2006: 41).  
4.1.5 1993  
The EU states that they are “greatly concerned at the resurgence of violence on 
the Lebanese-Israeli border, whether they concern operations by the Israeli army 
in Lebanon or attacks against Israel emanating from Lebanon” rendering it a 
diplomatic paragraph by the EU indicating that they are concerned with not 
taking, at least publicly, any sides and using forceful “condemning” words with 
explicit mention of Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 9). Nevertheless, the 
wording above indicates the awareness and public acknowledgement of attacks on 
Israel, as attacks from the Israeli army are occurring, which implies Hezbollah 
being behind them. Yet, the EU continues to refrain from explicitly naming them; 
most likely because the EU wants to maintain relations with Lebanon that will 
facilitate possible communication as opposed to destroy any chance of conducting 
dialogues by publicly naming and shaming Hezbollah. Furthermore, the EU 
begins to use words such as “greatly” concerned and “firmly” condemn, which 
convey forcefulness and a sense of urgency for all parties to resolve their 
differences and ensure political stability (Ibid). Furthermore, many of these 
statements are issued in the context of the Middle East Peace Process between 
Israel and Palestine as stated “…to pursue intensively the peace process 
negotiations…” which indicate the shared view that resolving political difficulties 
in Lebanon will lead to an important step in the peace process, and this includes 
that Hezbollah, an actor that cannot be excluded, take steps to refrain from any 
attempts of hindering possible progress.  
4.1.6 1996   
The tone of sentences formulated by the EU is cautious but forceful as seen mid 
statement; “the European Union is seriously concerned” and “deeply deplores the 
suffering inflicted on the civilian populations of both countries, in particular the 
tragedy of Qana […] Equally, it deeply deplores the attacks on Israel.” (Appendix: 
Statement 11). It’s evident that the EU tries immensely to be equally 
‘condemning’ of Israel and Hezbollah actions and not take any sides as they all 
the more begin to use forceful and strong words towards Hezbollah. Furthermore, 
the fact that Qana in southern Lebanon is a known Hezbollah stronghold (Alagha 
2006: 42-43), the EU refrained from making explicit reference to Hezbollah as the 
one responsible for the attacks on Israel. Additionally, the European Parliament, 
just four days before the Council issued its statement, made explicit reference to 
Hezbollah with regards to the event where they “condemned the attacks by 
Hezbollah terrorist movement against Israeli villages. However, it also felt that the 
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Israeli response to these violent attacks was disproportionate, particularly in the 
view of the consequences for civilians in Lebanon” (Appendix: Statement 10). 
Additionally, the Parliament further “condemn the Iranian Government for the 
support it gave terrorist groups like Hezbollah and called on it to drop its political 
opposition to the peace process”, which evidently shows the direct link between 
Iran and Hezbollah and the European Community’s knowledge of this, but to the 
best of their ability the Council refrains from agitating what is obviously a 
sensitive situation. However, despite the Council not naming Hezbollah directly, 
the fact that the Parliament did, denouncing Hezbollah and referring to it as a 
terrorist group shows that there are discussions within the Community that 
indicate negative and conflicting attitude towards Hezbollah. The negative attitude 
is identified in the title of the parliament’s resolution “Hezbollah attacks against 
northern Israel and Israeli retaliation” where Hezbollah is perceived as the 
instigator of the attacks and Israel’s use of violence is purely self-defence, but this 
is complimented by claiming that the attacks by Israel was considered 
“disproportionate”. The view of the parliament definitely provides a context to the 
Council’s softened language as to not upset Hezbollah and/or relations with the 
Lebanese Government. However, the view of the parliament provides a more 
explicit understanding of Hezbollah and deductively a much more negative 
attitude that the Council tries to downplay. Furthermore, the bomb attack in Saudi 
Arabia was deemed a terrorist attack by the EU targeting the American 
Headquarters in Dhahran and the EU firmly stipulating that “the attack is the latest 
in a wave of hostile and criminal acts perpetrated against those who serve in 
favour of peace in the Middle East” (Appendix: Statement 12).  Thus, those actors 
opposing the Middle East peace process has long been Hezbollah and Iran as the 
EU has mentioned in earlier statements (Appendix: Statement 9-12).  
4.1.7 2001  
The EU, for the first time, refers to Hezbollah by its name in the midst of an 
“Israeli attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon, the first in many years, as a 
retaliation for the Hizbollah attacks on the Shebaa farms, was an excessive and 
disproportionate reply” (Appendix: Statement 13). Here is identifiably the 
recognized change in the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah, thus the EU has until 
now only implicitly referred to Hezbollah. The use of the expression “excessive 
and disproportionate” is especially emphasized and follows with a sentence 
supporting the excessiveness by the Israelis by relaying their similar response on 
the Palestinian territories. The tone of the statement is one of restrain without 
using words, such as “Hizbollah terrorist attacks”. The EU’s view of the Israelis 
acting too harshly in their reply does provide the assumption that the EU 
somehow is slightly sympathetic towards the attacks the Lebanese people 
experienced than the Israelis. Moreover, the EU’s use of words such as 
“condemns” and “deplores” signifies a stronger use of words to convey a more 
determinant attitude towards Hezbollah as the EU also “condemns the renewed 
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attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli positions in the Shebaa farms sector and the 
Israeli’s army’s launch of missiles against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon” 
(Appendix: Statement 14). Despite the EU at times pertaining to fairly lenient 
responses, the EU has increasingly employed a stronger use of words to convey a 
forceful and dynamic attitude.  
4.1.8 2004  
The exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah was tremendously 
welcomed by the Council, in which they were “hoping that this would clear the 
way for the resolution of problems between Israel and Hezbollah”. It’s visibly 
apparent that the EU views Hezbollah as a fully-fledged, capable and powerful 
actor who cannot be excluded in any dialogues as they carry influential weight, as 
seen in the exchange of prisoners. What is more, the attitude of the EU with 
regards to this exchange of prisoners is evidently encouraging but utterly cautious 
(Appendix: Statement 15).  
4.1.9 2005 
In the wake of the former Lebanese Prime Minister’s assassination, the Council 
“strongly condemn the attack which cost the life of Mr Rafik Hariri” (Appendix: 
Statement 16). The EU’s use of the word “strongly condemn” conveys their 
forceful attitude and their firm empathy of the attack. Using the words “cost the 
life” implies that Rafik Hariri stood up for something that he later paid for, which 
leads one to interpret that amongst the people who opposed his political policies 
was an enemy. It corroborates with the EU’s view of suspiciousness since they 
felt the need to call for an international inquiry concerning the circumstances of 
his death. Hariri was unapologetically anti-Syrian and its interference in Lebanese 
matters (Wiegand 2009: 676), hence within that context the Hezbollah-Syria and 
the death of Hariri link has been questioned and still is with the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) set up by the UN (BBC.com 2014). Furthermore, the EU 
shows significant appreciation for Hariri and his work using positive expressions 
and words such as “paid tribute” and “the strengthening of relations between 
Lebanon and the EU”. However, the EU recognizes the sensitive situation, 
particularly by choosing to be watchful and wary about upcoming events as seen 
by using the word “vigilant”. Additionally, the role of foreign interference or 
influence is highlighted and criticized, which can again be interpreted to mean the 
Syrian and Iranian influence (Ibid). What is more, the EU presses the issue of 
resolving the circumstances surrounding the killing of Rafik Hariri “by means of a 
thorough investigation”, which implies that this issue is of significant importance 
to the EU (Appendix: Statement 17) and is issued within the context of the Syrian 
pledge “to withdraw all Syrian troops and intelligence services from Lebanon” 
(Ibid).  
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The Syrian interference is reiterated by the EU four months later with the outbreak 
of bombings which they “strongly condemn” by selecting words that have a 
forcefulness to them and expresses a profound concern for the regional instability, 
which Syria is contributing to (Appendix: Statement 18). The EU calls for “Syria 
to take action…and ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace 
Process and calling on them to abstain from the use of violence”, which implies 
Hezbollah. The style of words used by the EU such as “strongly condemns” and 
“deep concern” add an immense urgency to a sentence and/or word that is often 
required when conveying their support or in this case their disapproval. Again, 
Hezbollah is not directly mentioned but there is a link, as indicated by the EU, 
between Hezbollah and Syria; the shadow of Hezbollah follows implicitly in the 
mentioning of Syria or Syrian influence (Appendix: Statement 19). The 
continuous attacks on Lebanese personalities persists and negative wording is 
employed in describing the events; “assassination”, “murder”, “vicious”, and as 
the EU could have utilized softer words such as “attack” or “death” as have been 
used before, they didn’t and instead these words carry a strict forcefulness. The 
use of the words “vicious campaign” to describe the latest “assassinations” 
implies the awareness of the long meticulous planning needed to carry out these 
attacks. Additionally, the EU places a grave emphasis on “serious indications of 
the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian security services” in the attack on Mr 
Hariri and voices “its concern at the incomplete cooperation provided by the 
Syrian authorities” (Ibid). Hence, there are Syrian and Lebanese; Hezbollah, 
implications, consequently EU calls for the prosecution of those involved 
conveying their definite knowledge of Hezbollah and Syria’s involvement (Ibid).   
4.1.10 2006  
The Council ”condemned the attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the abduction of 
two Israeli soldiers. It called for their immediate and unconditional release and for 
the cessation of all attacks on Israeli towns and cities” (Appendix: Statement 20). 
Again, the EU utilizes the word “condemned” that has now become one of the 
forceful words employed to show their disapproval with Hezbollah. In parallel, 
the EU utilizes cautiousness when publicly referring to Hezbollah as not to upset 
the situation further, and can therefore be conceived as leniency towards 
Hezbollah. In addition, to make the condemnation less negative or balance it out 
the EU expresses its support for the Prime Minister immediately after condemning 
the attacks by Hezbollah. The tone towards Hezbollah is more condemning than 
before in the 1980s and 1990s with a newly developed cautious attitude (Ibid). 
The EU attributes sensitivity to Hezbollah, the circumstances and its role in the 
region, whilst still using forceful words to indicate their dissatisfaction. The 
context of these statements is the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war that increasingly 
spurred the explicit mention of Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 21). The 
structure of the sentences is formally composed, but strong dynamic words such 
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as “utmost” and “condemned” are employed as seen in “the Council expressed its 
utmost concern at the Lebanese and Israeli civilian causalities” and then continues 
by stating that “it condemned both the rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and 
the death of innocent civilians, mostly women and children, by Israeli air strikes 
such as that on the Lebanese village of Qana”. Moreover, Syria is called upon to 
“stop supporting Hezbollah” which suggests that the EU behind closed doors in 
fact have a fairly negative attitude towards Hezbollah, or at least their actions, but 
hold back from publicly stating Hezbollah in a very negative light (Appendix: 
Statement 22). This could be interpreted as the EU despite not condoning their 
violent activities, and perhaps not being very influential, formal relations with 
Lebanon is necessary and any public clash with Hezbollah might affect that 
relationship. Moreover, more attacks on Lebanese personalities occurred to which 
the EU “unreservedly condemns” and such “political assassinations or other 
terrorist acts […] by internal or external forces” are condemned completely 
(Appendix: Statement 23). This is the first time the EU states that these acts are 
perceived within the frame of terrorist acts. The EU shows determination in using 
words as “assassination” and “unreservedly condemns” and when calling upon 
Syria to not interfere in Lebanon on all accounts using the words “must”, “needs” 
and “should”, signifying the EU putting serious pressure on Syria and on those 
executing the targeted attacks on politicians. Hence, it’s apparent that a change in 
EU’s attitude has occurred due to the increasingly explicit reference to Hezbollah 
and stronger use of forceful words (Ibid).  
4.1.11 2007  
The EU has more explicitly mentioned Hezbollah over the years but implicit 
reference does occur, as seen in some statements and the term “all parties” is 
utilized giving the impression of a changed but a cautious attitude employed by 
the EU towards Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 24). The term “all parties” is 
employed in the context of the political deadlock in forming a government in 
Lebanon, which the EU seems to link to Hezbollah. Therefore, emphasizing that 
solution to the political deadlock is not through means of violence but 
communication, thus indicating that those violent attacks made to disrupt a 
political solution are most likely executed by those opposing a solution 
disadvantageous for some. Thus, in its contextual understanding, Hezbollah, with 
its supportive allies in Syria and Iran, seeking to increase their influence in the 
political system is the actor the EU is implicitly referring to as all three actors 
have special interest in Lebanon and the route its taking (Fadlallah & Soueid 
1995: 67). One of the violent attacks, which the EU “condemned in the strongest 
possible terms”, is the “assassination of Mr Eido, Member of Parliament, his son 
and others” (Appendix: Statement 25). Describing those executing the attack as 
“perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these ruthless acts” conveys a sharply 
negative and determined attitude of the EU as expressed by the Council. The 
Council could have expressed itself in a less colourful and provoking manner but 
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didn’t and consequently, it’s interpreted as wanting to make a forceful statement 
of deploring the attacks. Similarly, this attitude is further characterized in an 
attack that “claimed the life of six people including Member of Parliament 
Antoine Ghanem” and “urges all Lebanese parties and all actors in the region” to 
not resort to violence (Appendix: Statement 26).  
4.1.12 2008 
The Council “condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated in Beirut…the bombing 
of a US diplomatic vehicle…and the attack on Unifil”, and by characterizing it a 
terrorist attack the EU infers it to be meticulously planned by a well-organized 
faction. Although Hezbollah is an important actor and contributor in the political 
deadlock (Worth 2008), Hezbollah is not mentioned directly and the EU refrains 
from naming them despite their key role in its resolution (Appendix: Statement 
27). The solving of the political deadlock is highlighted and the EU congratulated 
“all parties concerned”, nonetheless the agreed conditions, which were all 
beneficial for Hezbollah are not addressed at all (Appendix: Statement 28; Worth 
2008).  
4.1.13 2010 
The EU posits that it is “convinced” that solving the killing of Rafik Hariri will 
yield a stable Lebanon and therefore, “calls on all parties to fully cooperate with 
the Tribunal”, and although Hezbollah is implicitly mentioned, the EU conveys its 
understanding of that interconnection wherein Hezbollah is an inherent part 
(Appendix: Statement 29). Furthermore, the EU calls on parties and actors in 
Lebanon and the region to not hinder and interfere with the work of the Tribunal. 
Hezbollah was supposedly instrumental in the attack on Rafik Hariri with Syrian 
support (Mehlis UNIIIC Report 2005), but the EU is refraining from explicitly 
naming or shedding any light in their role in the Tribunal especially since they 
imply that Hezbollah do play an instrumental role.  
4.1.14 2012 
The EU “condemns” and emphasizes the “repeated incursions by Syrian forces 
into Lebanese territory” and addresses the necessity of Lebanon avoiding any 
involvement in the Syrian crisis and calls on “all parties” to realize the Baabda 
Declaration and effectively disassociate from the Syrian conflict (Appendix: 
Statement 30). However, the EU understands Hezbollah’s role and implicitly call 
on them to not get involved in the Syrian conflict, despite reports stating they’re 
fighting alongside Bashar al-Assad supporters. Consequently, it makes Lebanese 
disassociation extremely difficult to abide by. On its entirety, the EU maintains a 
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supporting attitude whilst upholding a cautious, calculus and simultaneously a 
forceful and strong attitude, which can be perceived at times as a slightly 
indecisive attitude.  
4.1.15 2013  
In late July, the EU designated the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization effectively freezing all funds pertaining to Hezbollah’s military wing 
in Europe and all lines of communication (Appendix: Statement 31). However, 
the EU is careful to state that this designation does not affect EU dialogue with 
Lebanon and its political parties, and in doing so separating between Hezbollah as 
a political party and its military wing where the former is a significant part of the 
Lebanese government. Furthermore, the EU continuously reassures that it’s “fully 
committed to the stability of Lebanon” and their insistent reiteration that nothing 
has changed in the EU-Lebanon relations. The sense of both forcefulness and 
supporting attitude is conveyed with regards to this decision and by evaluating 
previous statements by the EU and its forceful attitude towards Hezbollah in 
recent years; there were not enough strong indications that would result in this 
partial designation. Yet in the context of this event, the designation seem to have 
been due to international pressure, but most importantly with events transpiring in 
Bulgaria; the bombing of a bus with Israelis and Cyprus; a Hezbollah operative 
plotting to attack Israelis; and Hezbollah’s increasing participation in Syria 
culminating in necessitating the EU to take action (Black 2013). Later that year, 
the EU “strongly” called on all parties and made an explicit reference to 
Hezbollah “to act responsibly, fully abide by Lebanon’s disassociation policy 
from the conflict in Syria” which evidently shows the EU’s increasing use of 
forceful words to emphasize their disapproving attitude (Appendix: Statement 32). 
The issue of neutrality continuous to be disputed and Hezbollah is construed as 
inviting violent clashes and contributing to the Syrian “spill-over of violence”. 
Furthermore, the EU balances the statement by underlining that the EU-Lebanon 
dialogue and relation with all political forces is imperative and encourages “all 
regional actors”, which here most importantly signifies Iran and Syria to be 
“constructive”, not just helpful but productive and not obstructive. Thereby, the 
selected time periods analysed above show that a change to the EU’s attitude 
towards Hezbollah has unfolded over the years and become markedly forceful and 
explicit in reference. 
4.2 Reasons for EU’s Changed attitude  
In this section I will attempt to explain why there has been a change during the 
selected time periods to the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah over the years. 
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Thereby, in November 1983, the EU expressed that the use of force occurs 
“particularly among the civilian”, which positively indicate that international 
forces have been targeted, which translates into the attacks on the 23rd October 
against the United States Marine Headquarters and barracks as well as a French 
station in Beirut which claimed the lives of 241 US Marines and 56 French 
soldiers (Mannes 2004: 170). In addition, the string of Hizbullah car bombs in 
November and December 1983 targeted French Multinational Forces in Lebanon 
all of which the Islamic Jihad took responsibility for and later became known as 
Hizbullah’s military wing (Ibid). Hence, the statement in November 1983 
confirms Hezbollah’s instigating mode that generated EU’s statement. Hezbollah 
has organized itself well since its emergence resulting in surreptitious operations 
as seen above, which has facilitated its global web reach and interactions (Levitt 
2013). Even though the statements from the EU is with a few months apart in the 
1980s, it needs to be taken into consideration that the EU was not very 
expeditious in the issuance of statements immediately after an occurrence in the 
1980s, nowadays the EU is incredibly quicker due to the technological 
advancements. Furthermore, the importance of Israel and Lebanon reaching 
security arrangements is emphasized in April 1985 (Appendix: Statement 4), 
which evidently is the result of a car bomb belonging to Hezbollah where 12 
Israeli soldiers are killed and 20 are injured. Additionally, the EU refers to the 
kidnapping of foreign nationals such as the American citizen and journalist, Terry 
Anderson being kidnapped by Hezbollah (Mannes 2004: 172). Their web of 
interactions show a great width to their capabilities among actors in the region as 
seen in their actions founded upon their socially constructed animosity towards 
Israel and its allies; the US. Thus, evident by the kidnapping of Americans as also 
seen in May when Hezbollah kidnapped an American official at the American 
University in Beirut as addressed by the EU (Mannes 2004: 172; Appendix: 
Statement 5). Evidently, the US did react to American’s being targeted in mid 
1980s and withdrew their troops home, as France and Italy did, effectively 
disbanding the multinational peacekeeping force (Front world 2013). Even though 
kidnappings still occurred, the US, despite being targeted, didn’t influence the 
attitudes of the EU markedly, which could be explained due to the more effective 
influence Iran could exert on Hezbollah because of its patron-student relation 
instead of what the former EC could do.  
 
Hezbollah’s actions seems to have coloured EU statement in June 1988 when 
responding to the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner, despite addressing it two 
months later at the Western Economic Summit, information confirmed Hezbollah 
operatives hijacking the flight and demanding the release of convicted Hezbollah 
terrorists in 7 bombings in Kuwait, amongst them American and French 
embassies in 1983 (Levitt 2013: 35-36 & 42). Hezbollah’s participation in these 
operations has yielded mixed EU attitudes, at least when it comes to explicitly 
naming Hezbollah as the responsible actor for the attacks. Hezbollah is by the end 
of the 1980s, based on the EU statements, an actor the EU is evermore noticing 
and following. EU reiterates a lasting ceasefire in response to a Saudi diplomat 
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being killed and the bombing of the Saudi embassy in Beirut in the same month of 
June 1989 (Mannes 2004:173). These attacks were considered an act of vengeance 
for executing Kuwaiti Shiites behind the bombing plans in Mecca (Appendix: 
Statement 8). Furthermore, Hezbollah has behaved in a provoking manner 
towards numeral states with aforementioned targeted attacks, the US, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel resulting in a threat perception and an “us vs. them” attitude 
thus, Hezbollah embodying the role of the enemy relinquishes the possibility for 
cooperation. Hezbollah, opposing the Middle East Peace Process continuously 
tries to disrupt it by for example the violent conflict in July 1993 as expressed by 
the EU (Appendix: Statement 9) resulting in several Israelis’ death in the hope of 
Israel attacking Lebanon and Syria (Katzman 1995: 11). The current state of 
affairs dictate indeed a multipolar world system and as Waltz envisioned, it’s 
evident that the more capable actors establish themselves onto the international 
scene like Hezbollah, the less stable it will be and even more intricate. The 
increasing existence of the multiplicity of actors with equal capabilities will result 
in actors feeling threatened by others, as has happened with Hezbollah on the 
international scene and a sense competitiveness which certainly explains 
Hezbollah, with the help of its patron Iran, challenging Western powers and their 
long held influence in international relations and for once not adapting to western 
conditions but creating their own conditions. However, it seems the more active 
Hezbollah gets and their reported involvement in attacks, the more they’re 
increasingly placed within the international system and constrained actors like 
Hezbollah are subjected to targeted sanctions, as seen later in 2013 (Black 2013). 
 
The suffering the EU deeply deplores in April 1996 concerning the tragedy of 
Qana in Southern Lebanon simultaneously the attacks on Israel is depicted 
forcefully. The Israelis fired rockets near the UN position of which it has been 
stationed for 18 years, which evidently shows the Israeli awareness of this, but 
Hezbollah reportedly fired missile rockets first from behind the UN building in 
Qana (Fisk 1996). The US reportedly stated, “Those who allowed the Hezbollah 
militia to act with impunity should bear responsibility for their actions” (UN Press 
Release 1996), but they seemingly didn’t influence the EU’s attitude to refer 
explicitly to Hezbollah. Furthermore, the EU expressed in statement 12, with 
“horror and indignation” of the attack that occurred in the American Headquarters 
in Saudi Arabia in June 1996. Strong evidence show Iranian military cooperating 
with the Saudi Hezbollah faction with the financial aid provided by the Iranian 
Ministry of Intelligence and security implicated by the captured Hezbollah 
operatives (Leonnig 2006). These attacks are interpretatively a string of attempts 
at hindering the Middle Eastern Peace Process; resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, which Iran and by extent Hezbollah is opposing and has combatted for a 
very long time as it is central to their raison d’être, eliminating Israel and fighting 
opposing allies (Gaub 2013:7-8). France recognizably hasn’t expressed itself in 
media at this point concerning Hezbollah that differs from the EU statements, 
which can be interpreted as they at least concurring with the EU expressed 
statements with regards to Hezbollah, thus it lies within France’s national interest 
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to continue with the EU’s forceful attitude paralleled with cautiousness towards 
Hezbollah. Especially, with the attacks against French soldiers situated in 
southern Lebanon as part of the Multinational peace-keeping force (Liphshiz 
2013) it’s within France’s interest to keep a cautious and not overtly provoke 
Hezbollah, thus the constructed interest is what determines how France acts. 
Additionally, France’s close relation with Lebanon and its long colonial ties 
would undoubtedly be affected as it could potentially affect Lebanon’s stability 
which is of great concern to France.        
 
In 2001 fighting erupted around the Shebaa farms, situated on the borders of 
Lebanon and the Golan Heights, therefore, it has long been an area of dispute and 
the Lebanese government and Hezbollah have long held that the Shebaa farms 
belong to Lebanon (BBC.co.uk 2001. The EU issued a statement just a few days 
after violent attacks erupted in April where the EU in fact explicitly referred to 
Hezbollah as one of the fighting factions and the axis of allies is evident in the 
disputed issue of the Shebaa farms (Appendix: Statement 13-14). Syria and Iran; 
Hezbollah’s axis of allies, has given more impetus for Hezbollah’s ability to act in 
certain ways and the Shebaa farms gave Hezbollah reason and justification for 
fighting with the Israelis, as part of their raison d’être (Ibid). The window of 
opportunity was grabbed by Hezbollah to show strength and capability to Israel 
and the international community, and so when the EU in January welcomed the 
large-scale exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah ample perception 
of its competence to protect Lebanon and its interest spread (Appendix: Statement 
15; Mannes 2004: 177). Hence, the exchange of prisoners shows the use of power 
as a means to acquire something of significant interest. Additionally, the EU does 
recognize the influential role Hezbollah plays in the region but specifically in 
Lebanon and to think they can be excluded in any developments or improvements 
in the country is reckless. Moreover, the assassination of the former Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, which the EU addressed within days of 
the attack, created a distinctive divide in Lebanon that has yet to be amalgamated 
(Bray-Collins 2013: 281). The assassination is commonly considered to have been 
at the hands of Syria, Hezbollah’s ally, reportedly due to Hariri growing more 
anti-Syrian and its continued interference in Lebanon (Ibid). Some months before 
his death, Hariri supposedly had been warned by Syria about breaking ties and so 
when Rafik Hariri’s close friend former French President Jacques Chirac 
demanded for an international inquiry (Dahdah 2005), it has visibly yielded 
concurrence from the EU, France and the US amongst few, demanding immediate 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and despite the US blaming Syria 
openly, the EU never swayed from their forceful but cautious stance (UN Security 
Council 2005). Its apparent that the US and France concurred with EU opinion of 
calling for an international investigation which must have contributed to the EU’s 
attitude of a more forceful stance on this event and Syria’s role and Hezbollah’s 
partner (Appendix: Statement 16-18; Dahdah 2005).     
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Furthermore, in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, politically 
motivated attacks claimed the loss of many political personalities, which the EU 
publicly condemned in statement 19 amongst them the murder of Gibran Tueni 
and his companions who were Syrian critics assassinated on the 12th December 
(Knudsen 2010: 15). The American president at the time, George W Bush 
deplored the attack and stated “efforts by Damascus and Tehran to foment 
instability in Lebanon must stop now” (BBC.co.uk 2007). The US equal 
condemnation apparently increased EU’s determined support for the UN 
International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) as it in statement 19 
notes “serious indication of Lebanese and Syrian involvement in Hariri’s death. It 
is further confirmed by leaked Syrian documents revealing Hezbollah’s 
cooperation and involvement in Tueni’s death (Naharnet Newsdesk 2012). The 
enemy imagery is further strengthened by the EU to an extent, the US and France 
especially by requiring an international inquiry than a Lebanese national inquiry 
investigating the assassinations. The constructed shared understanding of 
Hezbollah with allies Iran and Syria has seemingly prompted the EU to adjust 
their attitude towards them in a fashion that still allows them to continue formal 
political dialogues and cooperation possibilities with the Lebanese government. 
The actions by Hezbollah in July 2006 attacking Israel and kidnapping two Israeli 
soldiers prompted condemning response just days after the attacks triggered by 
Hezbollah that amounted to war until August 14th (Geukjian 2008: 136). The 
explicit call by the EU to Syria to stop supporting Hezbollah in statement 22 
fundamentally affirms the complexities of the existence of multipolarity in the 
international system and the difficulties in engaging with such actors and hence, 
their attitude towards Hezbollah, but also Iran and Syria as supporters of such 
behaviour. Hezbollah instigated the violent attacks by attacking an Israeli army 
convoy, which added to the common view of Hezbollah as a capably violent 
instigator changing the EU attitude towards them and the use of proxy wars by 
Syria and Iran (Appendix: Statement 20-22; Tür 2007: 117). While France and the 
EU critiqued Israeli retaliation as excessive, the US initially stated “Israel’s right 
to defend herself” but later in the evening urged Israel to exercise restraint and 
think about the civilian causalities (Baker 2006). France challenged the US hands-
off strategy by pushing for a UN resolution, which resulted in the increase of the 
UNIFIL force in the south and a ceasefire in August 14th (Tisdall & MacAskill 
2006). The EU, in statement 23, emphasizing the central role of the new UNIFIL 
force and the new Security Council Resolution 1701, clearly shows the particular 
influence of France during the 2006 conflict. 
 
Disruptions continued with the assassination of the Industry Minister Pierre 
Gemayel in order to stall the forming of a government; the political deadlock 
(Appendix: Statement 23-24; Schwerma 2010: 70). The only way of resolving the 
political deadlock meant Hezbollah acquiring a veto right, consequently 
solidifying Hezbollah’s firm influential grip on the Lebanese government 
(Kechichian 2014). This veto right complicates things further for the EU, their 
attitude towards Hezbollah and knowing how to appropriately engage with them. 
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With the veto right, Hezbollah is an essential part of the Lebanese government 
meaning that any negative statement about Hezbollah could very well affect and 
disrupt the EU-Lebanon relation effectively isolating Lebanon from any EU 
dialogue which is contrary to the EU constantly reiterated commitment to 
Lebanon and its people as in statement 23. Naturally, the actions of Hezbollah 
clearly do affect the EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah and their perception of the 
actor as evident by their forceful but cautious tone; however, due to their long 
proclaimed commitment of Lebanon it hinders them from being completely 
negative of Hezbollah. Thus, the EU attempts to exercise a balancing act; keeping 
good relations with Lebanon on the one hand and issuing statements of events 
Hezbollah participates in on the other, which is also what is expected of the EU. 
Additionally, an example is the assassination on the Internal Security Captain 
Wissam Eid in January 2008 where a Canadian report incriminated members of 
Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 27; Levitt 2013: 7). The signing of the Doha 
Agreement effectively resolving the political deadlock in May 2008 was 
welcomed by the EU in a congratulated manner, something the US agreed with 
stating it being a “good step” (Worth 2008), however, it was still perceived as a 
setback for the US as it had pushed for Hizbollah to be disarmed and reduce Iran’s 
influence in the region (telegraph.co.uk 2008). Thus, their ability to influence the 
EU’s attitude was lacking as the EU welcomed the Doha agreement. 
 
Moreover, the setting up of the International tribunal investigating the killing of 
Rafik Hariri in 2006 is the reason why minsters from the Hezbollah party resigned 
from the government, which lead to the political deadlock (BBC.com 2014). 
Hence, the contestation of the tribunal has never seized and continues until today 
and actors in the region, mainly Iran and Syria is encouraged to not obstruct the 
work of the tribunal (Appendix: Statement 29). Furthermore, the conflict in Syria 
in 2011 has increasingly spread into Lebanon and resulted in violent attacks 
around Lebanon between pro-Syrian Hezbollah allies and the Syrian opposition 
targeting Hezbollah since they strongly support Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and his 
regime (Appendix: Statement 30; Kechichian 2014). The EU stated all parties 
including Hezbollah should abide by a disassociation policy from Syria and claim 
neutral ground, however, Hezbollah’s continuous active involvement in the 
conflict fighting against the Syrian opposition seemingly elevated the necessity of 
discussing Hezbollah as their active role in international politics is evermore 
growing. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah said, “His participation in the 
Syrian battles alongside regime forces is a final decision which his party would 
never reverse” (theDailystar 2013). Adding to the mix, there was attempted attack 
in Cyprus on Israeli tourists in July after a confessed Hezbollah member collected 
information on and planned to attack Israelis (Reuters 2013). Additionally, an 
attack happened in Bulgaria claiming the lives of five Israelis and has strong links 
to Hezbollah executing the attack (BBC.com 2013). At this point, these attacks on 
European soil presumably lead the way to partially designating Hezbollah a 
terrorist organization. Nevertheless, leading up to this the US and Israel have 
continuously pressured the EU for a complete terrorist designation, and whereas 
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EU members United Kingdom and the Netherlands has reinforced such pressure, 
France has especially opposed it (Liphshiz 2013). France apparently fear that 
designating them a terrorist organization would restrict their relations with and 
interests in Lebanon, destabilize the country as well as the French citizens serving 
in Lebanon probably becoming targets. France’s colonial ties and national 
interests seem to have influenced the EU’s attitude in amalgamation of the 
compelling events that seem to have necessitated such a response. France’s 
apprehension seems to have been accommodated as a partial designation was 
agreed upon, the US effectively failing to influence EU’s attitude towards 
Hezbollah in a complete designation, whilst France was quite successful in its 
endeavours. Hezbollah rejects EU’s partial designation and state that Hezbollah 
has one deciding management for both the political party and the resistance 
(Latimes.com 2009), which by disregarding this indicate France’s determined 
interest and successful endeavour in this partial classification. France influencing 
EU’s attitude in this way effectively shows its capabilities and persuading power 
with regards to an actor like Hezbollah in a multipolar international system.  
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5 Conclusion  
Over the years, with world events faced with every day, the EU’s need to respond 
is expected and required especially with challenges moderate Islamist non-state 
actors bring and terrorist actions, on European soil nonetheless, is a dominate one 
that cannot be disregarded. Hezbollah is a significant Islamist actor with a web of 
continuous interactions internationally and with its increasingly growing 
influential role in political circles and their military capabilities, indications 
suggest that alternative approaches towards Islamist moderate actors has 
increasingly been explored indicating a change in attitude. There has evidently 
been a change in EU’s attitude towards Hezbollah over time, at least over the last 
18 years, where Hezbollah has more explicitly and forcefully been described and 
referred to in amalgamation with the increasing use of stronger and determined 
vocabulary such as “strongly”, “deeply”, “deplores”, “condemns”, 
“assassination”, “killings” etc. The forceful use of words in amalgamation of 
Hezbollah very much confirms an evident change in EU attitude. However, over 
the recent years a cautious tone, occasionally seen in the implicit reference, has 
also developed parallel to the forcefulness, which indicates the increasing 
sensitiveness pertaining to the role Hezbollah currently plays in the international 
arena. Hezbollah being a political and a militant actor not completely renouncing 
from the use of violent tactics does complicate the appropriate EU attitude 
towards Hezbollah.  
 
In this paper, I argue that the EU has in fact adopted a much more forceful but 
cautious attitude towards Hezbollah over time and I argue that it is mostly due to 
Hezbollah’s own increased activities which has resulted in the EU being rather 
reactive than proactive in the international arena. The amalgamated use of both 
Social Constructivist and Neorealist theories has aided the understanding and 
explanation of the argument as the theoretical assumptions contend that the 
inherent state of anarchy in the international system wherein states are situated are 
not the absolute key actors in world politics. The assumption is highly relevant in 
the multipolar international system we live in. Furthermore, this study shows that 
it’s evident France has, as opposed to the US, influenced the EU’s attitude more 
on specific events, and that is mainly due to their strategic interests in Lebanon as 
well as their colonial ties. However, the main explanation for the change in EU’s 
attitude is undoubtedly Hezbollah’s increasing public activities in various events 
such as the Burga bus bomb in Bulgaria and the attempted attack in Cyprus, but 
also their active participation in Syria and fighting with the ruling president. Thus, 
with the axis of allies: Iran and Syria, Hezbollah’s influence in many parts of the 
world is increasingly growing, and at times more difficult to curb. This analysis 
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shows that the EU is thoroughly reactive to Hezbollah’s activities, which is 
evident by the EU’s changed attitude over the years that have become more 
forceful and determined. Simultaneously, the cautious tone that has developed in 
parallel is mainly to keep good relations with Lebanon and not generate instability 
and by extent the region where Iran and Syria, is thoroughly involved. The EU’s 
reactive nature in a multipolar international system where states are not the 
absolute actors, is imperative and one that has generated an increasingly 
determined attitude from the EU, but with the influence Hezbollah has in the 
Middle Eastern region and its international width it becomes a sensitive issue to 
have an attitude about and the recently developed cautious tone very much 
explains this. The analysis also shows that the EU is seemingly beginning to view 
Hezbollah as a more ‘secular’ actor and not so much as an Islamic fundamentalist 
one, which undoubtedly characterizes the EU’s changed attitude towards 
Hezbollah over time, which could also provide possible indications for future 
change in EU attitude and approach towards other Islamist non-state actors. 
Moreover, there are numerous ways in which further research could be conducted 
on this topic and amongst them are covering a specific time period when a 
particular phenomenon occurred and investigate EU attitudes during that time or 
conduct a comparative analysis on the European media perceptions and the 
official EU attitude toward Hezbollah or any other Islamist non-state actor or even 
compare EU’s attitude towards different non-state actors thus, the possibilities are 
endless.          
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7 Appendix 
1. “At the meeting in Athens on 12 September the Foreign Ministers of the 
Ten adopted the following statement on the situation in Lebanon: ‘The 
situation in Lebanon is more critical than at any other time in the last 16 
months. The number of innocent victims increases every day. The 
international community must do all it can to help put an end to this 
tragedy before it leads to the disintegration of Lebanon. The Ten appeal 
for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of violence and 
pressure in Lebanon, and to national reconciliation. They call upon all 
parties to respect the integrity of Lebanon and the authority of its 
government. They stress the need for early progress towards the complete 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, except as the Lebanese 
Government may request otherwise. They are ready to work for these 
objectives, jointly and individually. They are convinced that the abnormal 
situation in Lebanon, so long as it continues, is a further obstacle to the 
achievement of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East as a 
whole’” (Bull. EC 9-1983, point 2.4.1. p.82). 
 
2. The parliament adopted resolution on the situation in Lebanon; “…on the 
resumption of hostilities in Lebanon: deploring the attacks perpetrated 
against soldiers of the multinational peace-keeping force, whose sole aim 
in going to Lebanon was to help restore peace, and condemning the 
shelling of the Christian areas of the Lebanese capital and the mountains, 
Parliament urged all the Governments of the Member States to increase 
their active support for the Lebanese Government in its efforts to restore 
national sovereignty…” (Bull. EC 9-1983point 2.4.13. p.89) 
 
3. On the 22 November the minsters held an initial discussion to prepare the 
ground for the European Council to state its view when it meets in 
December on the situation in Lebanon and the whole problem of the 
Middle East. They reviewed the present situation in Lebanon and 
expressed concern about the fate of the Palestinians in Tripoli. The 
Discussion followed the statement by the Ten ”The Ten are deeply 
concerned at the fighting in the north of Lebanon, which is causing 
intolerable suffering and large-scale loss of life, particularly among the 
civilian population of the region, Palestinians and Lebanese alike. The 
Ten, who have frequently expressed their opposition to the use or threat of 
force in the Middle East, appeal to all those concerned to put an 
immediate halt to the fighting and let reason and moderation prevail. The 
fresh outbreak of violence highlights more than ever the urgent need to 
seek a negotiated settlement of the region’s problems, in accordance with 
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the principles, which the Ten set out in the conclusions of the European 
Council on 29 June 1982 and in subsequent statements. In particular, self-
determination for the Palestinian people, with all that this implies, 
remains a fundamental issue which must be dealt with in the context of a 
fair and lasting overall solution to the conflict” (Bull. EC 11-1983, point 
2.4.2. p.68). 
 
4. At their political cooperation meeting in Luxembourg on 29 April the 
Foreign ministers of the Ten adopted the following statement on the 
Middle East. “The Ten continue to view with concern the deterioration of 
the situation in Lebanon and in particular its consequences for the civilian 
population in the south, which continues to be subjected to unjustifiable 
acts of violence. Following the Israeli Government’s decision to withdraw 
its forces, they look for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of 
those forces from that region in accordance with the relevant resolutions 
of the UN Security Council, as well as of those other forces which are not 
there at the request of the Lebanese Government. The Ten consider it 
important that appropriate security arrangements be reached between the 
Israeli and Lebanese Governments. The Ten appeal to all the parties 
concerned, both within Lebanon and outside, to act in such a way as to 
facilitate the process of restoring the sovereignty, unity, territorial 
integrity and independence of Lebanon, a process which has been 
seriously compromised by the recent worsening of the political and 
security situation. The Ten reaffirm their support for UNIFIL’s role, 
avoiding all incidents, cooperating fully with the force and ensuring the 
safety of its personnel. They are deeply concerned at the suffering of the 
Lebanese people and at the kidnappings involving foreign nationals.” 
(Bull. EC 4-1985, point 2.4.1. p.59).   
 
5. While the Council was meeting in Brussels on 20 May, the Foreign 
Ministers issued the following statement on Lebanon: “Recalling their 
statement of 29 April, the 10 Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European 
Communities express deep concern for the deteriorating situation in 
Lebanon, where clashes between various groups are becoming more 
serious, acts of violence are increasing and whole populations are leaving 
their homes. They appeal to all parties concerned for the resumption of the 
dialogue between the various Lebanese groups and the holding of a true 
national reconciliation conference. The Ten reiterate their conviction that 
only if present internal differences are overcome can Lebanon preserve its 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and are ready to contribute in 
the search for such a solution. (Bull. EC 5-1985, point 2.4.1. pp.81).   
 
6. Statements on Lebanon were issued by the Foreign Ministers on 13 June in 
Luxembourg: “The Twelve follow with concern the critical situation in 
Lebanon, which urgently requires a political solution after 13 years of war 
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and suffering. The proper functioning and strengthening of Lebanon’s 
constitutional bodies is a precondition such a solution. The Twelve 
therefore believe that the orderly and constitutional conduct of the 
forthcoming presidential election will be of decisive importance for the 
future of the Lebanese Republic. They call upon all parties involved to 
support the preparation and good conduct of the election. The Twelve are 
convinced that the lasting peace can only be achieved by national 
conciliation and a just solution of the internal problems, taking into 
account the legitimate interests of all of the different communities of the 
country. This implies that all should be prepared to make mutual 
concessions. To this end the Twelve appeal to all parties to work together 
constructively for an early political solution to the Lebanese crisis and its 
regional implications. The Twelve furthermore stress the need to intensify 
efforts aimed at restoration of the sovereignty, unity, independence and 
territorial integrity of Lebanon. The full independence and sovereignty of 
Lebanon must be respected, and it must solve its problems without foreign 
involvement or interference. The Twelve underline their support for 
UNIFIL and call upon all parties to ensure these forces are allowed to 
fulfil their mandate without hindrance. The Twelve once more condemn 
the fact that hostages are still being held in Lebanon, and call for their 
immediate release.” (Bull. EC 6-1988, point 2.4.2. p.117-118). 
 
7. Western Economic Summit, Toronto 20 and 21 June 1988 on terrorism: 
“We strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all its form, 
including the taking of hostages. We renew our commitment to policies 
and measures agree at previous summits, in particular those against State-
sponsored terrorism. We strongly condemn recent threats to air security, 
in particular the destruction of Korean airliner and the hijacking of 
Kuwaiti airliner. We recall the principle affirmed in previous declarations 
that terrorists must not go unpunished. We appeal to all countries who are 
not party to the international conventions on civil aviation security, in 
particular the Hague Convention, to accede to those conventions. We 
express support for work currently under way in the International civil 
aviation Organization aimed at strengthening international protection 
against hijacking. We welcome the most recent declaration adopted by the 
ICAO Council which endorses the principle that hijacked aircraft should 
not be allowed to take off once they have landed, except in circumstances 
as specified in the ICAO declarations. We welcome the adoption this year 
in Montreal and Rome of two international agreements on aviation and 
maritime security to enhance the safety of travellers. We reaffirm our 
determination to continue the fight against terrorism through the 
application of rule of law, the policy of no concessions to terrorists and 
their sponsors, and international cooperation.” (Bull. EC 6-1988, point 
3.5.39. p.174). 
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8. The Madrid European Council, 26 and 27 June: “The European Council 
reiterates its determination to continue contributing to the settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and has approved the attached declaration (à 
point 1.1.23). In this context, the European Council considers that a 
definitive solution to the Lebanese crisis should be urgently negotiated and 
implemented. It confirms the full support of the Twelve for the Committee 
of Three set up by the Arab League Summit in Casablanca. The European 
Council calls on all parties involved to cooperate fully with the committee 
of Three with the aim of achieving a complete and lasting ceasefire and a 
just political solution to the Lebanese crisis based on the sovereignty, 
unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The European Council 
considers that a political solution should be based on the election of a 
President, political reforms and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
troops. It renews its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all 
hostages in Lebanon and elsewhere. It reaffirms its full support for 
UNIFIL. The European Council has expressed its hope that the Iranian 
leaders will prove, by concrete actions, their willingness to develop 
constructive relations with the Community and its Member States, on the 
basis of freedom, tolerance and respect for international law.” (Bull. EC 
6-1989, point 1.1.17. p. 14). 
 
9. The following statement was published in Brussels on 27 July: “The 
European Community and its Member States are greatly concerned at the 
resurgence of violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border, whether they 
concern operations by the Israeli army in Lebanon or attacks against 
Israel emanating from Lebanon. They firmly condemn once more all acts 
of violence whatever their origin. They deeply regret the civilian 
casualties resulting from such violence and operations, which have 
already caused the exodus of several thousand people. The civilian 
population throughout the region has a right to peace and security. They 
call for an immediate stop to all such actions directed against the 
sovereignty of Lebanon, its territorial integrity and its independence and 
which threaten the peace process. They also call on all parties concerned 
to respect and cooperate with the UN forces in the region. The European 
Community and its Member States recall that they have for many years 
called for the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425. 
The all-too-long years of violence and conflict have shown that the use of 
force and recourse to violence have brought neither a solution nor the 
prospect of peace for any of the parties involved. They call on all parties 
to show restraint and to pursue intensively the peace process negotiations, 
which have reached a crucial phase. Only their successful conclusion will 
offer any hope of an untroubled future for this region and its sorely tried 
people”. (Bull. EC 7/8-1993, point 1.4.13. p. 104). 
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10. Parliament resolution on Hezbollah attacks against northern Israel and 
Israeli retaliation. Adopted on 18 April. “Parliament roundly condemned 
the attacks by Hezbollah terrorist movement against Israeli villages. 
However, it also felt that the Israeli response to these violent attacks was 
disproportionate, particularly in view of the consequences for civilians in 
Lebanon. It reiterated its behalf that the peace process was the only viable 
way of ensuring lasting peace and stability in the Middle East. Parliament 
went on to condemn the Iranian Government for the support it gave 
terrorist groups like Hezbollah and called on it to drop its political 
opposition to the peace process. It called on the EU presidency to take the 
diplomatic steps necessary to enable it to mediate an end to the fighting 
and to strengthen the Union’s contribution to the peace process. In 
addition, the Commission was asked to provide emergency humanitarian 
aid for Lebanese refugees.” (EU. Bull 4-1996, 1.4.68. p.75). 
 
11. The following European Union statement on Lebanon was published at the 
Council meeting held in Luxembourg on 22 April: “The European Union 
seriously concerned by the aggravation of the situation in Lebanon and 
northern Israel. It renews its appeal for an immediate cease-fire and, in 
this context, supports UN Security Council resolution1052. It considers 
that only a political solution can bring an end to the current crisis and 
allow the peace process to resume its course.  It considers that the 
populations of Israel and Lebanon must be able to live in peace and 
security. The European Union deeply deplores the suffering inflicted on 
the civilian populations of both countries, in particular the tragedy of 
Qana (Southern Lebanon), and the loss of human lives, which continues to 
increase. Equally, it deeply deplores the attacks on Israel. Current events 
also risk compromising the peace process and stability in the Middle East. 
The European Union insists that all the parties, whether directly or 
indirectly involved in the current conflict, contribute to an immediate halt 
to hostilities and acts of violence with the aim of allowing peace 
negotiations to resume. The European Union reaffirms its support for all 
the parties involved in peace negotiations. It confirms its willingness to 
contribute actively to the search in progress for an immediate halt to 
hostilities and a lasting peace in the region. In this regard it supports the 
action undertaken by the presidency, the troika and Member States, 
notably France, who have been in the region or made representations in 
recent days. It supports all the efforts, notably those of the USA, currently 
being undertaken with the same purpose. The aim of these efforts must be 
to obtain, with an immediate halt to hostilities and acts of violence, the 
elaboration of a lasting agreement between the parties, which would not 
prejudice a global agreement between Israel and Lebanon in the context 
of the peace process. This agreement must contribute towards 
guaranteeing Israel’s security and preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, in 
accordance with the Security Council resolution 425, to which the 
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European Union remains committed. The European Union expresses its 
support for the continuing efforts of United Interim Forces in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), in highly adverse circumstances, which have included horrific 
injuries to four Fijian peacekeepers at Qana, to try and alleviate the 
effects of the current violence and ensure the safety of the civilian 
population. Lebanon, which for some years has been courageously 
engaged in reconstruction, must be able to find once again the peace to 
which, like its neighbours, it has a right. The European union will 
continue to provide assistance to that Lebanon can take its rightful place 
in peace and prosperity in the Middle East. In this regard the European 
Union will pursue its support for Lebanon’s reconstruction and 
development, particularly in the field of energy. It declares itself ready to 
increase significantly the substantial humanitarian contribution ehich it is 
already making, by means of national contributions, to relieve the 
suffering of the civilian population and in particular the refugees in 
southern Lebanon. In this context it launches an appeal for free and 
secure circulation on the coastal road south of Beirut with the sole 
purpose of guaranteeing access for humanitarian assistance to the 
population of Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh. The European Union reaffirms 
its commitment to pursue diplomatic efforts in the region and expresses its 
willingness to participate in proposals aimed at promoting just, lasting 
and comprehensive peace ” (EU. Bull 4-1996, 1.4.11. p.59-60). 
 
12. The following presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on 
the bomb attack in Saudi Arabia was published in Rome on 27 June and in 
Brussels on 28 June. “The European Union has learned with horror and 
indignation the news of the terrorist attack on the American headquarters 
in Dhahran, in which so many people lost their lives or were wounded, 
criminally carried out when Secretary of State Warren Christopher is 
engaged in a new and delicate peace mission in the region. The attack is 
the latest in a wave of hostile and criminal acts perpetrated against those 
who serve in favour of peace in the Middle East. In expressing its 
condolences to the relatives of the victims, the European Union wishes to 
reaffirm, as solemnly reiterated at the recent Florence European Council, 
its absolute condemnation of the scourge of terrorism and political 
violence and its continuing support in favour of stabilization and peace-
building in the Middle East.” (EU. Bull 6-1996, 1.4.8. p.122-123). 
 
13. The following Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on 
the escalation of violence in the Middle East was published in Brussels 
and Stockholm on 18 April. “The European Union is extremely concerned 
about the dangerous escalation of violence in the Middle East. The Israeli 
attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon, the first in many years, as retaliation 
for the Hizbollah attacks on the Shebaa farms, was an excessive and 
disproportionate reply. Furthermore, the excessive use of the army and the 
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disproportionate Israeli reply to mortar attacks from Palestinian 
administered territories on Israeli targets further escalate violence and 
aggravate the conflict. Israeli incursions into Palestinian controlled 
territories are illegal and must not be repeated. The spiral of violence 
must be reversed. The price to be paid by the peoples of the region could 
be high. The European Union urges all parties to act with maximum 
restraint, restore calm and do their utmost to prevent actions, which may 
claim new victims. The European Union remains convinced that there is 
no alternative to a negotiated solution based on international law, in 
particular UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of land for 
peace. The Union encourages both parties to engage in serious attempts to 
find a negotiated solution at this critical juncture and welcomes efforts 
that are made to this effect such as the Egyptian-Jordanian 
initiative.”(EU. Bull 4-2001, 1.6.14). 
 
14. The following Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on 
the escalation of violence in the Middle East was published in Brussels on 
3 July. “The European Union expresses its deep concern at the upsurge in 
violence in the Middle East. It condemns both the latest car bomb 
explosions in Yahud in the suburbs of Tel Aviv and the extrajudicial 
execution by Israel of three Palestinian militants. With regard to the latest 
developments in Lebanon, the European Union refers to its statement of 18 
April 2001 and also condemns the renewed attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli 
positions in the Shebaa farms sector and the Israeli's army's launch of 
missiles against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. The European Union 
urges all parties to show the utmost restraint and to work resolutely to 
break the spiral of violence, the main victims of which are civilians. The 
European Union is convinced that negotiation offers the only solution to 
the problems that beset the region and considers that all possible steps 
must be taken to implement in full the recommendations made in the report 
of the Sharm-el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell report), starting 
with a strict observance of the ceasefire.”(EU. Bull 7/8-2001, 1.6.25). 
 
15. Council conclusions on the Middle East peace process. Adopted on 26 
January. “The Council welcomed the announcement of the conclusion of 
an agreement on the exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah, 
hoping that this would clear the way for the resolution of problems 
between Israel and Lebanon as regards prisoners and prisoners' 
remains.” (EU. Bull. 1/2-2004, 1.6.118.). 
 
16. Council conclusions on the attack carried out in Beirut. Adopted on 21 
February. “The Council strongly condemned the attack which cost the life 
of Mr Rafik Hariri, the former President of the Council of Ministers of 
Lebanon. It paid tribute to the work Mr Hariri did for his country and for 
the strengthening of relations between Lebanon and the EU and called for 
an international inquiry. The Council agreed to remain vigilant so that the 
forthcoming legislative elections in Lebanon be held in accordance with a 
free and fair electoral process, without any foreign interference or 
influence.” (EU Bull. 1/2-2005-1.6.61). 
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17. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 16 March. “The Council 
noted the reappointment of the outgoing prime minister to form a new 
government. It hoped to see the early formation of a government able to 
act in the interests of all Lebanese. The Council reiterated the importance 
it attached to the holding, on schedule, of free, fair and transparent 
elections, in accordance with the Lebanese constitution, without any 
outside interference or meddling. It also reiterated its call for the full 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). The Council 
called on Syria to implement rapidly the pledges made by President 
Bashar Al Assad to withdraw all Syrian troops and intelligence services 
from Lebanon. It also urged the Lebanese authorities to clear up the 
circumstances of the killing of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr 
Rafik Hariri, by means of a thorough investigation.” (EU. Bull. 3-2005, 
1.6.36.). 
 
18. Council conclusions on Lebanon and Syria. Adopted on 18 July. “The 
Council strongly condemns the bombings which have taken place since 
October 2004 and calls upon the Lebanese government to mount a full 
investigation into these attacks. It underlines the importance of full 
implementation of UNSCR 1595 (2005) and the need for all parties to 
cooperate towards this. In this context, the Council reaffirms its full 
support for the international investigation Commission into the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese Head of Government. 
While noting the withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon, it 
expresses deep concern at the current situation in the region and calls on 
Syria to take action to promote regional stability, including by: supporting 
the legitimate and sovereign new government of Lebanon and allowing for 
smooth circulation of goods between the two countries; supporting the 
political process in Iraq including by cooperating with the Iraqi 
authorities to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists; and 
ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace Process and 
calling on them to abstain from the use of violence. Lastly, the Council 
welcomes the nomination of Mr Fouad Siniora as the President of the 
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lebanon and the successful 
completion of legislative elections in Lebanon, which represents a decisive 
step towards an independent, sovereign and democratic Lebanon.” (EU 
Bull. 7/8-2005, 1.6.57). 
 
19. Brussels European Council, 15-16 December. Annexes to the Presidency 
Conclusions. “The European Council reiterates its support for Lebanon's 
unity, stability and independence, and reminds its neighbors of their 
obligations to respect Lebanon's sovereignty. The European Council 
strongly condemns the assassination of Gibran Tueni and the murder of 
companions travelling with him. This assassination is the latest in a 
vicious campaign against Lebanese citizens, journalists, political leaders 
and their right to freedom of expression. The European Council also notes 
with extreme concern the conclusions of the second report of the UN 
International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) under Mr 
  67 
Detlev Mehlis. It notes the confirmation of serious indications of the 
involvement of Lebanese and Syrian security services in the assassination 
of Rafiq Hariri, and expresses its concern at the incomplete cooperation 
provided by the Syrian authorities to the Commission. It urges Syria to 
cooperate unconditionally with UNIIC as they continue their efforts to 
bring to justice those responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. It 
welcomes the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1644 of 15 December which 
extends the mandate of the UNIIIC; authorizes the UNIIIC to provide 
technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations into 
other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004; and 
acknowledges the Lebanese government's request that those charged with 
involvement in Rafiq Hariri's assassination should be tried in a tribunal of 
an international character. The European Council reaffirms its full 
support for the government of Lebanon and urges it to extend its authority 
throughout the country and to tackle urgently economic and political 
reform as agreed at the Core Group meeting held in New York last 
September. It welcomes the international conference to be held in early 
2006. It reminds all concerned of their obligation to implement UNSCR 
1559 in its entirety, including the disbanding and disarmament of all 
militias.” (EU Bull. 12-2005, I.27). 
 
20. Council conclusions on the Middle East. Adopted on 17 July. 
“Developments in Lebanon and Israel: the Council condemned the attacks 
by Hezbollah on Israel and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. It called 
for their immediate and unconditional release and for the cessation of all 
attacks on Israeli towns and cities. The EU expressed its support for 
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, recalled the need for the 
Lebanese state to restore its sovereignty over the whole of its national 
territory and for the full implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1559(2004) and 1680(2006).” (EU. Bull. 7/8-2006, 
1.33.8). 
 
21. Council conclusions on the crisis in Lebanon. Adopted on 1 August. “The 
Council expressed its utmost concern at the Lebanese and Israeli civilian 
casualties and human suffering, the widespread destruction of civilian 
infrastructure and the increased number of internally displaced persons 
following the escalation of violence and called for an immediate cessation 
of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable ceasefire. It condemned both 
the rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the death of innocent 
civilians, mostly women and children, by Israeli air strikes such as that on 
the Lebanese village of Qana. It also stated that all attacks against United 
Nations personnel are unacceptable and deplored the tragic deaths of four 
UN military observers. The Council expressed its full support for the 
efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council to be rapidly 
convened to define a political framework for a lasting solution agreed by 
all parties, which is a necessary precondition for deployment of an 
international force. EU Member States have indicated their readiness to 
contribute to such an operation together with international partners. The 
Council underlined the EU's commitment to Lebanon, to its full 
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sovereignty, and to its long-term political and economic partnership with 
Europe. The EU is ready to contribute to rebuilding a Lebanese state able 
to exercise full sovereignty on its territory and to protect its people. It 
reiterated its determination to work with the wider international 
community to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Lebanon and 
called on all parties to grant secure and efficient passage for the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance to southern Lebanon. Thus far the Community 
and EU Member States have committed over EUR 56 million to the relief 
efforts, with another EUR 52 million in pledges. Turning to the continuing 
violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the Council expressed its concern at 
the equally distressing humanitarian situation and reiterated its call for 
the parties to return to the peace process on the basis of the roadmap 
which it considers the only path to achieving a viable independent 
Palestinian state which can live side by side, in peace and security with 
Israel.” (EU Bull. 7/8-2006, 1.33.6). 
 
22. Council Conclusions on: Syria. “European Parliament resolution 
containing the European Parliament's recommendation to the Council on 
the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean association agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Syrian Arab Republic, of the other part. It asked the Council to strengthen 
its initiatives with a view to deepening the cooperation between the EU 
and Syria and ultimately signing that agreement, while taking account of a 
number of recommendations. These include: calling on Syria to respect 
Lebanon's security, refrain from interfering in its internal affairs, establish 
formal diplomatic relations with Lebanon and stop supporting Hezbollah” 
(EU Bull. 10-2006, 1.33.5). 
 
23. Annex II to presidency conclusions. Brussels European Council 14-15 
Dec. Declaration on Lebanon. “The European Council is concerned by the 
deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, and underlines its determination 
to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. 
A solution to the current political deadlock should be sought only through 
dialogue and with full respect for the democratic institutions of the 
country. The European Council confirms its full support to the efforts of 
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the legitimate and democratically 
elected government, aimed at maintaining dialogue with all political 
actors in Lebanon and at tackling the important challenges it is facing, in 
particular fully implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 and reconstructing 
the country. The European Council calls on all parties in the region to 
comply with the resolution, notably the arms embargo. It urges Israel to 
stop violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force. The 
European Council unreservedly condemns the assassination of Industry 
Minister Pierre Gemayel and any attempt by internal or external forces to 
destabilize Lebanon through political assassinations or other terrorist 
acts. It expects those who committed such crimes to be identified and 
brought to justice. In this context, the European Council welcomes the 
endorsement by the Lebanese Council of Ministers of the draft status of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1664, and looks 
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forward to the early completion of the remaining steps necessary for the 
establishment of the Tribunal. The European Council reaffirms its support 
for the efforts aimed at the reconstruction and the prosperity of Lebanon. 
It reiterates the willingness of the EU to actively contribute, in close 
coordination with the Lebanese government, to the full success of the 
International Conference in support to Lebanon due to take place in Paris 
on 25 January 2007. The European Council recognizes the need for urgent 
financial backing in order to lay a sound foundation for the future 
economic and social development in Lebanon. The EU and its Member 
States by their prominent role in the new UNIFIL have demonstrated their 
commitment to the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 with a 
view to reaching a long-term solution to the questions that led to last 
summer's confrontations. The European Council welcomes the recent 
report by the UN Secretary-General and his intention to consider the 
possibilities for a greater UN role on the Shebaa farms issue including the 
suggestion by the Lebanese Government to place the area under UN 
jurisdiction until permanent border delineation and sovereignty over them 
is settled. The European Council calls for the immediate release of the two 
abducted Israeli soldiers. The European Council calls upon all Lebanese 
and regional actors to show responsible leadership and full respect for 
Lebanese democratic institutions. Syria must end all interference in 
Lebanese internal affairs and actively engage in the stabilization of 
Lebanon and the region. Syria needs to do so to be in a position to develop 
normal relations with the international community, including with the EU. 
Syria should recognize, and cooperate with, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon.” (EU Bull. 12-2006, I.15). 
 
24. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 12 February. “The Council 
welcomed the success of the international conference in support of 
Lebanon held in Paris on 25 January 2007. By pledging more than USD 
7.6 billion in aid, the international community has sent a strong message 
of support to the people of Lebanon and its legitimate and democratically 
elected government. The EU and its Member States contributed more than 
40 % of the total aid pledged at the Paris conference. These resources will 
contribute to meeting the challenges of reconstruction and macroeconomic 
stabilization, to the benefit of the entire Lebanese population. The 
adoption of the EU-Lebanon action plan in the context of the European 
neighborhood policy will enable further deepening of our existing 
cooperation within the framework of the association agreement and of the 
Barcelona process. The Council expressed great concern about the 
renewed violent clashes of the past weeks in Lebanon. It urged all parties 
to refrain from all forms of violence and to do everything possible to 
prevent an escalation of the situation. A solution to the current political 
deadlock should be sought only through dialogue and with full respect for 
the democratic institutions of the country. The Council recalled its 
commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
Lebanon and renewed its call for the full and speedy implementation of 
Resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1664 (2006). It reiterated its call on Syria 
and other countries in the region to refrain from interfering in the 
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domestic affairs of Lebanon and to actively engage in the stabilization of 
Lebanon.” (EU Bull. 1/2 -2007, 1.34.5). 
 
25. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted at its session of 17 and 18 June. 
“The Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the assassination 
of Mr Eido, Member of Parliament, his son and others on 13 June. It 
recalled that Mr Eido and other personalities targeted since 2004 had 
distinguished themselves by their struggle for an independent, sovereign 
and stable Lebanon, free of foreign interference. The Council expressed its 
support for the efforts by the Lebanese government and the security forces 
to bring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these ruthless acts to 
justice and to ensure security and stability throughout Lebanon. The 
Council reaffirmed its determination to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence and its support for the legitimate 
and democratic government of Mr Siniora, Prime Minister. The Council 
went on to strongly condemn the attacks on Lebanese security forces by 
terrorist groups operating from the Palestinian refugee camps at Nahr el 
Bared and Ain el Hilweh, and the recent bomb attacks. It deplored the loss 
of life and human suffering caused by the terrorist violence, including the 
killing of two Lebanese Red Cross workers on 11 June. The Council 
concluded by reiterating its call on all political forces in Lebanon to 
search for a solution to the current political deadlock and to develop the 
widest possible consensus for the forthcoming election of the President of 
the Republic. Dialogue and full respect for the democratic institutions of 
the country should be the guiding principles of the political process, in the 
interest of all Lebanese people.” (EU. Bull. 6-2007, 1.34.4). 
 
26. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 15 October. “The Council 
condemned in the strongest terms the car bomb attack perpetrated on 19 
September in Beirut, which claimed the life of six people including 
Member of Parliament Antoine Ghanem. It urges all Lebanese parties and 
all actors in the region to refrain from any activities that would further 
endanger the political stability of Lebanon. The Council is following 
closely the electoral process and has taken note that the Parliamentary 
session to elect a new president of the republic has been adjourned to 23 
October. It called for the holding of free and fair presidential elections, 
without foreign interference and in conformity with the deadline set by the 
constitution. The Council welcomed the end of the crisis caused by 
extremist militants entrenched in Nahr el Bared Palestinian refugee camp 
and reiterated its full support for the Lebanese Government and armed 
forces. Finally, the Council recalled previous statements and remains 
determined to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity 
and independence, according notably to UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 
1701 and 1757.” (EU Bull. 10-2007, 1.34.4). 
 
27. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 28 January. “The Council: 
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-Condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated in Beirut on 25 January, the 
bombing of a US diplomatic vehicle on 15 January and the attack on 
UNIFIL on 8 January; 
 -Remains concerned at the continued absence of a Head of State in 
Lebanon and regrets that the Parliamentary session has been postponed 
yet again until 11 February; 
-Welcomed the unanimous endorsement, of a plan for the immediate 
election of the President by the extraordinary session of the foreign 
ministers of the Arab League held on 6 January in Cairo, the formation of 
a national unity government and the adoption of a new electoral law; 
-Called upon all parties to work responsibly in order to implement the 
plan of the Arab League without delay; 
-Reiterated its support to the legitimate and democratic government of 
Prime Minister Siniora and to the Lebanese armed forces and their 
contribution to the stability of the country; 
-Looks forward to the start of the work of the special tribunal; 
-Condemned the rocket attack launched against Israel on 8 January.” 
(EU. Bull. 1/2-2008, 1.35.9). 
 
28. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted by the Council at its session of 
26 and 27 May. “The Council welcomed the agreement reached in Doha 
on 21 May that opens the path towards a full resumption of the functioning 
of all democratic institutions of the State of Lebanon. It welcomed the 
election of General Suleiman as President of Lebanon. The Council also 
congratulated the parties concerned for their constructive approach and 
their will to engage in dialogue and in particular commended the efforts of 
the Arab League. The Council reaffirmed its solidarity with the people of 
Lebanon and its full support to the government and other democratic 
institutions. It also commended the Lebanese armed forces and their 
contribution to the stability of the country. However, it deplored the recent 
acts of violence and reiterated its firm denunciation of all attempts aimed 
at undermining peace and stability in Lebanon.” (EU Bull. 5-2008, 
1.35.4). 
 
29. Council Conclusions on Lebanon 22 Nov 2010. 3048th Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting. The Council adopted the following conclusions: “1. The 
Council reaffirms its full support to the Government of National Unity led 
by PM Hariri, established in the wake of democratic elections. Concerned 
by the situation in Lebanon, it calls on parties to further engage in 
dialogue in the spirit of consensus and to respect the rule of law. The 
Council supports the Lebanese institutions, the full implementation of the 
Doha Agreement and of the principles enshrined in the Lebanese 
Constitution and the Taif accord. 2. The Council also reaffirms the full 
support of the European Union for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 
as an independent court, created by UNSCR 1757 and following the 
highest judicial standards, as unequivocally reaffirmed in a recent 
statement by the UN Secretary- General. The Council expresses its 
concern at intimidations and condemns attempts to hinder the work of the 
STL. 3. The Council is convinced that achieving international justice on 
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the killing of Rafik Hariri and others, and preserving stability in Lebanon 
are mutually reinforcing. It calls on all parties to fully cooperate with the 
Tribunal in order to put an end to impunity and bring stability to the 
country. It recalls legal obligations stemming from UNSCR 1757. The 
Council further calls upon all parties and actors, both in the country and 
in the region, to play a constructive role, not to interfere in the Tribunal's 
work and not to prejudge its outcome. 4. The Council remains determined 
to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, 
unity and stability. The Council recalls its commitment to the full 
implementation of all relevant UNSC Resolutions, including 1559, 1680, 
1701 and 1757. 5. The Council commends the crucial role of UNIFIL, 
whose activities alongside the Lebanese army continue to be essential for 
peace in the region. The Council calls for the implementation of all 
provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701, for respect of the blue line in its 
entirety and for the full cooperation with the United Nations and 
UNIFIL.” 
 
30. The Council adopted the following conclusions on Lebanon. p, 12-13. 
Foreign Affairs Council 19 Nov 2012. 1. "The EU strongly condemns the 
bomb attack on 19 October 2012 in Beirut, which killed Brigadier General 
Wissam al-Hassan, Head of Information Branch of the Interior Security 
Forces, and two other people, and injured many others. This act of 
violence, as well as other assassination attempts, must be fully 
investigated and the perpetrators must be brought to justice swiftly. 
Impunity and political violence cannot be tolerated in a democratic 
society. 2. The EU stresses the importance of preserving Lebanon’s 
national unity and stability. The EU encourages all political forces to 
participate constructively in the dialogue efforts being led by President 
Michel Sleiman and to fully implement the Baabda Declaration agreed in 
the framework of the National Dialogue. 3. The EU condemns the 
repeated incursions by Syrian forces into the Lebanese territory and 
reaffirms its commitment to the unity, stability, independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The EU underlines the importance of 
Lebanon’s efforts to avoid the spill-over of violence from neighbouring 
Syria. In this regard, it calls on all parties to fully implement the 
provisions of the Baabda Declaration on the necessity to disassociate from 
regional conflicts, which can have negative repercussions for Lebanon. 4. 
The EU commends the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese population 
for the support provided to the people fleeing violence in Syria. It 
reaffirms its readiness to step up its assistance, as the needs further 
increase. 5. The EU recalls the importance of strong, independent and 
democratic Lebanese public institutions. Their continued work is essential 
for preserving stability and unity in Lebanon, as stressed by the High 
Representative during her recent timely visit to Lebanon. The EU 
welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese security forces, including the 
Lebanese Armed Forces, to ensure security for all people living on 
Lebanese territory, with due respect for the rule of law and human rights. 
The EU recalls its commitment to support Lebanon’s institutions and 
security forces in fulfilling this role. 6. The EU stresses the importance of 
  73 
Lebanon’s continued commitment to the full implementation of all its 
international obligations, including UNSC resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701, 
1757. Recalling all its previous Council conclusions, the EU reaffirms its 
full support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and calls on all parties 
to fully cooperate with it. 7. The EU encourages Lebanon to pursue its 
reform process, including in view of the 2013 parliamentary elections. In 
this context, the EU stresses the importance of its partnership with 
Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
looks forward to a reinforced cooperation with Lebanon as outlined in the 
new ENP Action Plan currently under adoption." 
 
31. Joint Council and Commission Declaration on the specific restrictive 
measures to combat terrorism. Brussels, 25 July 2013. “The Council and 
the Commission underline that the decision to designate the Hezbollah 
Military Wing under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application 
of restrictive measures to combat terrorism does not prevent the 
continuation of dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon. In addition, 
the Council and the Commission agree that the decision does not affect 
legitimate financial transfers to Lebanon and the delivery of assistance, 
including humanitarian assistance, from the European Union and its 
Member States in Lebanon. The Union remains fully committed to the 
stability of Lebanon. As for all designations under Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP, this decision will be reviewed on a six-monthly basis.” 
 
32. Council conclusions on Lebanon. FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting 
Brussels, 16 December 2013 "1. The EU reaffirms its commitment to the 
unity, stability, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Lebanon. 2. The EU condemns the repeated violence and security 
incidents, including the latest terrorist attack targeting the Iranian 
Embassy and the recurrent clashes in Tripoli. The EU welcomes the efforts 
of the Lebanese security forces, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, to 
protect Lebanon's borders and ensure security for all people living on 
Lebanese territory, with due respect for the rule of law and human rights. 
3. The EU strongly calls on all parties, including Hezbollah, to act 
responsibly, fully abide by Lebanon's dissociation policy from the conflict 
in Syria and support the efforts of President Sleiman to implement the 
provisions of the Baabda Declaration agreed by all political forces. 4. The 
EU underlines the importance of continuing the national dialogue among 
all political forces to overcome all divisions and the current stalemate and 
move towards a broader agreement on the future of the country. The EU 
calls on all regional actors to play a constructive role in this regard. 5. 
The EU calls on Lebanon to urgently form a new Government capable to 
address the extraordinary humanitarian, economic and security 
challenges the country is facing. The EU looks forward to the timely 
holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 
encourages Lebanon to carry out necessary electoral reforms. 6. The EU 
commends the Lebanese authorities for their open border policy and 
reiterates its appreciation for the support and generosity demonstrated by 
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the authorities and population towards all the people fleeing the conflict in 
Syria. The EU expresses its concern at the unprecedented effect the crisis 
has on the stability of Lebanon as well as on its natural and economic 
resources, educational systems, health care and labor markets. 7. As the 
largest donor of humanitarian and development assistance in Lebanon the 
EU will continue to contribute to meeting the growing needs of host 
communities and refugees. The EU underlines the importance of 
supporting local host communities through social and economic measures 
to mitigate the impact of the refugee influx from Syria. In this regard, the 
EU looks forward to the coming UN Regional Response Plan and will 
mobilize appropriate funding. The EU also reiterates its call on 
international partners to increase their support to Lebanon, including at 
the upcoming Kuwait 2 Conference. 8. The EU recalls its commitment to 
support Lebanon's institutions and security forces, as well as its readiness 
to continue this assistance and explore possibilities for increased support 
to the Lebanese Armed Forces.  The EU welcomes all efforts by the 
international community, including the International Support Group for 
Lebanon, to support and stabilize the country at this critical juncture. The 
EU stresses the importance of Lebanon's ownership to steer and keep the 
momentum of these international efforts. 9. The EU attaches high 
importance to its partnership with Lebanon under the European 
Neighborhood Policy and encourages Lebanon to pursue its reform 
agenda. The EU looks forward to the reinforced cooperation agreed in the 
new EU-Lebanon ENP Action Plan. 10. The EU stresses the importance of 
Lebanon's continued commitment to the full implementation of its 
international obligations, including UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701, 
1757.  The EU reaffirms its support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) and calls on the Lebanese authorities to continue fulfilling their 
obligations regarding the STL, including the financial contribution.  The 
EU reiterates its support to the role of UNIFIL in supporting peace and 
stability in South Lebanon."  
  
 
 
 
 
